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I. INTRODUCTION 
The topic of this symposium is whether Minnesota is 
progressive.  The specific focus of this article is whether the 
Minnesota tort system is progressive.  The answer to that question 
depends on a number of other questions.  First, what are the 
components of the tort system?  Second, what are the primary 
motivating principles of the system?  Third, how is the term 
“progressive” defined for purposes of evaluating the system, and as 
applied to the tort system, what conclusions does it yield?  Other 
questions might be whether the tort system in Minnesota is liberal, 
or conservative, or, perhaps, moderate, with the overriding 
question of whether those labels make any difference. 
As to the first question, the tort system is a mosaic that 
includes the common law of torts and statutory modifications of 
that law.  The common law is modified in various ways by the 
legislature.  In extreme cases, the common law may be supplanted 
by legislation, in whole or in part, as with the passage of workers’ 
compensation acts or no-fault automobile insurance.  Legislation 
may also supplement the common law by filling gaps where the 
common law is deficient.  Civil damage or dram shop acts are good 
examples.  Finally, legislation may simply cut back tort law, such as 
by capping damages, modifying or eliminating the rule of joint and 
several liability or the common law collateral source rule, or by 
limiting or eliminating the availability of punitive damages.  A 
broader look might include an evaluation of the effectiveness of 
the two primary no-fault systems that limit or eliminate reliance on 
tort law, the role of insurance law in supporting the tort system, or 
the system of rules and regulations intended to promote societal 
safety.  This article focuses more narrowly on the common law of 
torts in Minnesota as it has been structured by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court and modifications of the common law of torts by 
the Minnesota State Legislature. 
The second question draws not on the academic debate over 
the appropriate theoretical justifications of tort law, but rather on 
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s view of the principles that tort law 
should achieve.  Those principles are varied and reflective of the 
court’s intent to confine the common law within appropriate limits. 
The third set of questions, the definition of “progressive” and 
its application to the tort system in Minnesota, may be the most 
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difficult question, given the lack of a clear definition of the term 
“progressive.”  The literature abounds with discussions of 
progressivism, but finding an appropriate definition or sense of 
what progressivism means is only part of the problem.  The last step 
is to determine whether Minnesota’s tort system fits that definition, 
and, finally, why it matters. 
II. MINNESOTA’S TORT SYSTEM 
Standard accounts of tort law typically emphasize the central 
importance of fault in the development of tort law,1 refer to a 
period of expansion of tort law from the 1960s to the 1980s,2 and 
note the ensuing retrenchment of tort law as the expansive rules 
were limited.3  In general, the evidence of the evolution of 
Minnesota common law roughly tracks the standard accounts.  The 
discussion that follows focuses first on the supreme court’s view of 
common law adaptability and then on the court’s specific responses 
to a variety of recurring issues in tort law in order to determine an 
appropriate characterization, not of individuals’ decisions, but 
rather of the body of the court’s tort decisions. 
A. The Foundation for Common Law Change 
In a string of cases spanning almost ninety years, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently recognized the 
adaptability of the common law to changing conditions.  Tuttle v. 
Buck,4 decided in 1909, is an excellent early example.  The plaintiff, 
a small town barber, alleged that the defendant, a banker, started 
working as a barber for the purpose of driving the plaintiff out of 
business.5  Justice Elliott,6 writing for the court, set out his views, 
 
 1. E.g., David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703, 703–05 (1992). 
 2. E.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of 
Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 603 (1992). 
 3. E.g., Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster:  
The American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
1, 52 (2002). 
 4. 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Charles B. Elliott was Associate Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court 
from 1905 to 1909, when he resigned to accept a presidential appointment as 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. Minnesota State 
Law Library, Docket Series, Biographies of Justices and Judges of the Minnesota Appellate 
courts, http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/judgebio.html#elliott (last visited Nov. 8, 
2006).  He would have been a Taft appointment, raising a question as to whether 
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stating: 
[T]he common law is the result of growth, and . . . its 
development has been determined by the social needs of 
the community which it governs.  It is the resultant of 
conflicting social forces, and those forces which are for 
the time dominant leave their impress upon the law.  It is 
of judicial origin, and seeks to establish doctrines and 
rules for the determination, protection, and enforcement 
of legal rights.  Manifestly it must change as society 
changes and new rights are recognized.  To be an efficient 
instrument, and not a mere abstraction, it must gradually 
adapt itself to changed conditions.  Necessarily its form 
and substance has been greatly affected by prevalent 
economic theories.  For generations there has been a 
practical agreement upon the proposition that 
competition in trade and business is desirable, and this 
idea has found expression in the decisions of the courts as 
well as in statutes.  But it has led to grievous and manifold 
wrongs to individuals, and many courts have manifested 
an earnest desire to protect the individuals from the evils 
which result from unrestrained business competition.  
The problem has been to so adjust matters as to preserve 
the principle of competition and yet guard against its 
abuse to the unnecessary injury to the individual.  So the 
principle that a man may use his own property according 
to his own needs and desires, while true in the abstract, is 
subject to many limitations in the concrete.  Men cannot 
always, in civilized society, be allowed to use their own 
property as their interests or desires may dictate without 
reference to the fact that they have neighbors whose 
rights are as sacred as their own.  The existence and well-
being of society requires that each and every person shall 
conduct himself consistently with the fact that he is a 
social and reasonable person.  The purpose for which a 
man is using his own property may thus sometimes 
determine his rights, and applications of the idea are 
found in Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmer, 89 Minn. 58, 93 N. 
W. 907, 60 L. R. A. 875, 99 Am. St. Rep. 541, Id., 92 Minn. 
230, 99 N. W. 882, and Barclay v. Abraham, 121 Iowa, 619, 
96 N. W. 1080, 64 L. R. A. 255, 100 Am. St. Rep. 365.7 
 
he might be labeled as a progressive, particularly in light of the views he expressed 
in his opinion in Tuttle. 
 7. Tuttle, 107 Minn. at 148–49, 119 N.W. at 947. 
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The court held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action.8 
Forty years later, in Miller v. Monsen,9 the issue was whether the 
court should recognize a cause of action by a minor for 
enticement10 against the defendant, who enticed his mother away 
from the family.11  Relying in part on Tuttle, the court held that the 
action should be recognized: 
Novelty of an asserted right and lack of common-law 
precedent therefor are no reasons for denying its 
existence.  The common law does not consist of absolute, 
fixed, and inflexible rules, but rather of broad and 
comprehensive principles based on justice, reason, and 
common sense.  It is of judicial origin and promulgation.  
Its principles have been determined by the social needs of 
the community and have changed with changes in such 
needs.  These principles are susceptible of adaptation to 
new conditions, interests, relations, and usages as the 
progress of society may require.12 
Miller notes Tuttle in emphasizing the capacity of the common law 
for change.13 
More recently, in Vaughn v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,14 the court 
considered the issue of whether a negligence claim by a passenger 
with a disability who sustained a shoulder injury because the airline 
refused to permit her to check all of her bags was preempted by the 
Minnesota Human Rights Act.  The court held that the airline has a 
common law duty to assist the disabled with carry-on baggage if the 
carrier has knowledge of the physical disability and need for 
assistance in order to avoid physical injury, and the injury was 
reasonably foreseeable to the airline.15  Relying on Tuttle and Miller, 
the court commented on the nature of common law decision 
making: 
Our common law is the result of accumulated experience.  
It is composed of rules carefully crafted both to reflect our 
traditions as a state and to address emerging societal 
 
 8. Id. at 151–52, 119 N.W. at 948. 
 9. 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949). 
 10. The legislature abolished heart balm claims, such as alienation of 
affections, criminal conversation, seduction, and breach of contract to marry, in 
1978.  See MINN. STAT. § 553.01 (2004). 
 11. Miller, 228 Minn. at 400, 37 N.W.2d at 544. 
 12. Id. at 406, 37 N.W.2d at 547 (citations omitted). 
 13. Id., 37 N.W.2d at 547. 
 14. 558 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1997). 
 15. Id. at 744. 
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needs.  See Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 407, 37 N.W.2d 
543, 547 (1949); Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 148–49, 
119 N.W. 946, 947 (1909); see also Prosser § 54, at 359.  
Law is perhaps no substitute for ethics, and most disputes 
will be and should be resolved outside a courtroom.  As a 
practical matter, tort may never encompass every duty of 
good citizenship that we commonly expect from each 
other.  But in this case, a legal duty cannot be denied.16 
In Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,17 in which the supreme court 
adopted three prongs of the tort of invasion of privacy, the court 
explained that “[the common law] is of judicial origin, and seeks to 
establish doctrines and rules for the determination, protection, and 
enforcement of legal rights,” that “[the common law] must change 
as society changes and new rights are recognized,” and that “[t]o 
be an efficient instrument, and not a mere abstraction, it must 
gradually adapt itself to changed conditions.”18 
B. Minnesota Tort Law 
Basic negligence principles were established by the supreme 
court by 1910, when the court decided O’Brien v. American Bridge 
Co.,19 but common law change is evident throughout the supreme 
court’s torts cases as the court expanded and rounded out the law 
of negligence.  Strict liability made an early appearance in 
Minnesota, but met with limited acceptance in the twentieth 
century.  This section scans a variety of Minnesota Supreme Court 
tort law decisions in order to provide a broader picture of what 
common tort liability looks like in Minnesota, but also a rough 
sense of what motivated the court to decide specific cases in a 
certain way.  The policies that the supreme court has articulated in 
its decisions as it patrols the corners of tort law vary.  There is no 
single rationale or set of policy justifications that guides the court 
in deciding torts cases.  In part, the view of the tort system depends 
on the time frame.  Aside from adopting new causes of action, the 
court has also removed barriers to the imposition of liability, 
particularly during the 1960s and 1970s.  While adhering to the 
fault concept, the court removed governmental and intra-family 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998). 
 18. Id. at 234, (the latter proposition citing Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 148–
49, 119 N.W. 946, 947 (1909)). 
 19. 110 Minn. 364, 366–67, 125 N.W. 1012, 1013 (1910). 
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immunities as bars to liability,20 although the scope of government 
liability has continued to be problematic. 
The court has been particularly concerned about undue 
extensions of liability and the impact those extensions might have 
on the tort-litigation system as a whole.  Its decisions also reflect a 
concern that tort law be kept within appropriate limits, that it not 
inappropriately invade the domain of contract law, and that due 
regard be given to separation of powers.  Throughout the 
decisions, there is a core fault concept that limits undue extensions 
of tort law.  Products liability theory is an excellent example, as the 
court has moved from strict liability to a negligence-based theory in 
design-defect and failure-to-warn cases.  The court has also on 
occasion emphasized the compensatory21 and deterrence22 
functions of tort law.  In general, its decisions closely tailor liability 
to fault.  Sometimes, however, the court has sanctioned the 
imposition of strict liability rules based upon a particular group’s 
superior cost-bearing capabilities.  The cases discussed span 
roughly fifty years. 
The court is also concerned about achieving balance in the 
tort system.  Sovereign immunity is a good example.  While 
abolishing sovereign immunity, and reading the concept 
restrictively as far as damages limitations, the court has developed 
and applied defenses to governmental tort liability that restrict the 
liability of governmental entities. 
1. Tort Liability and Family Relationships 
The supreme court chipped away at intra-family tort 
immunities over a period of years.  In 1966, the court abolished the 
immunity of an unemancipated child in Balts v. Balts:23 
 
 20. Charitable immunities, however, never gained a foothold in Minnesota.  
See Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 398, 175 N.W. 
699, 701 (1920). 
 21. Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 271, 279 
(Minn. 1995) (Stringer, J., dissenting) (noting that tort cases are intended to 
provide compensation for the injured person); Thompson v. Petroff’s Estate, 319 
N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1982) (“Under modern tort theory, the primary reason 
for the existence of a cause of action is to provide a means of compensation for 
the injured victim.”). 
 22. Phelps, 537 N.W.2d at 279 (Stringer, J., dissenting) (adding that 
deterrence is also an important function of the tort system, but that it operates 
through the damages mechanism). 
 23. 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1968). 
6. STEENSON - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC 12/15/2006  1:30:01 PM 
246 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
We are of the opinion that experience has demonstrated 
no necessity for continuing the doctrine of immunity as a 
defense in tort actions brought by a parent against a child.  
Our conclusion is influenced by the increasing frequency 
and severity of automobile accidents and the seriousness 
of attendant injuries to members of the same household.  
The fact that in most instances the driver is covered by 
liability insurance minimizes the likelihood of intrafamily 
discord.  While, of course, our decision will also affect the 
uninsured and will reach into family activities beyond the 
operation of an automobile, the prospect of vexatious or 
collusive litigation we believe has no substantial basis.  
Only where a serious wrong has been committed is it 
likely that children’s torts will be brought to the attention 
of the courts.  Otherwise, we are persuaded that the good 
judgment, restraint, and discernment of parents, lawyers, 
judges, and juries will act as an effective deterrent to the 
prosecution of fraudulent or frivolous litigation.24 
The court abolished parent-child tort immunity in Silesky v. 
Kelman25 in 1968, except in cases “(1) where the alleged negligent 
act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the 
child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise 
of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of 
food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other 
care.”26 
In 1969, in Beaudette v. Frana, 27 the supreme court called 
interspousal immunity “the last vestige of the judicially established 
rule of intrafamily immunity in actions for tort,” 28 and it abolished 
the immunity.29  Surveying the immunities, the court noted that the 
favored rationale for abrogation of any of the family immunities “is 
that the social gain of providing tangible financial protection for 
those whom an insured wrongdoer ordinarily has the most natural 
motive to protect transcends the more intangible social loss of 
impairing the integrity of the family relationship.”30 
But the court was not quite finished with immunities.  In 
 
 24. Id. at 433, 142 N.W.2d at 75. 
 25. 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968). 
 26. Id. at 442, 161 N.W.2d at 638. 
 27. 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969). 
 28. Id. at 367, 173 N.W.2d at 417. 
 29. Id. at 373, 173 N.W.2d at 420. 
 30. Id. at 371, 173 N.W.2d at 419. 
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Anderson v. Stream31 in 1980, the court relied on the Balts rationale 
to totally abolish parent-child tort immunity, removing the 
immunity exceptions it had retained in Silesky.32 
In cases involving injury to family relationships, the common 
law permitted husbands to recover for loss of consortium for 
injuries to their wives, but the traditional rule denied wives and 
children the right to recover for loss of consortium because of 
injuries to husbands and fathers.33  In Thill v. Modern Erecting Co.,34 
the court modified the traditional rule to permit a wife to recover 
for loss of consortium for injuries caused to her husband by the 
negligent act of a third party.35  In Plain v. Plain,36 the court held 
that a child could not recover damages for loss of maternal services 
from his or her mother for negligently injuring herself.37  In Salin v. 
Kloempken,38 in 1982, the court held that a child was not entitled to 
recover for loss of parental consortium for injuries to his parents 
caused by the negligent acts of third parties.  While recognizing the 
sympathetic and logical appeal of the claims,39 the court found the 
countervailing policy reasons against recognition too strong: 
If the claim were allowed there would be a substantial 
accretion of liability against the tortfeasor arising out of a 
single transaction (typically the negligent operation of an 
automobile).  Whereas the assertion of a spouse’s demand 
for loss of consortium involves the joining of only a single 
companion claim in the action with that of the injured 
person, the right here debated would entail adding as 
many companion claims as the injured parent had minor 
children, each such claim entitled to separate appraisal 
and award.  The defendant’s burden would be further 
enlarged if the claims were founded upon injuries to both 
parents.  Magnification of damage awards to a single 
family derived from a single accident might well become a 
serious problem to a particular defendant as well as in 
 
 31. 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980). 
 32. See id. at 600–01 (overruling Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 
N.W.2d 631 (1968)). 
 33. See, e.g., Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 380–81, 263 N.W. 154, 
156 (1935), overruled in part by Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 514, 
170 N.W.2d 865, 870 (1969). 
 34. 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969). 
 35. See id. at 513, 170 N.W.2d at 869. 
 36. 307 Minn. 399, 240 N.W.2d 330 (1976). 
 37. See id. at 402–03, 240 N.W.2d at 332. 
 38. 322 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982). 
 39. Id. at 737. 
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terms of the total cost of such enhanced awards to the 
insured community as a whole.40 
In addition, procedural problems aside, the court was concerned 
about the intangible nature of the child’s loss and the difficulty of 
assessing damages, which further created the potential for double 
recovery.41  The court also expressed concern about the impact of 
damages awards for loss of parental consortium: 
We also cannot ignore the social burden of providing 
damages for loss of parental consortium merely because 
the money to pay such awards comes initially from the 
negligent defendant or his insurer.  Realistically the 
burden of paying damage awards will be borne by the 
public generally in increased insurance premiums or, 
alternatively, in the enhanced danger that accrues from 
the greater number of people who may choose to go 
without insurance.  Moreover, we must take into account 
the cost of administration of a system to determine and 
pay consortium awards.  Since virtually every injury to a 
parent with minor children would be accompanied by a 
claim for loss of parental consortium, the expenses of 
settling or litigating these claims would be sizable.  The 
social cost resulting from the expenditure of valuable 
judicial resources in litigating these claims would be 
substantial.42 
In arriving at its conclusion, the court emphasized that it 
recognized its authority and obligation to change the common law 
in response to changing social conditions, and that its decision was 
not based on the rationale of some cases that deferred to the 
legislature on the issue.43 
In 1990, in Larson v. Dunn,44 the supreme court refused to 
recognize a new tort of interference with custodial rights.  The 
supreme court focused on the steady increase of family law 
litigation over the previous twenty-five years and the necessity it 
illustrated to both the court and legislature of focusing not only on 
the interests of the parents in disputes over children, but also on 
the best interests and welfare of their children.  The court 
 
 40. Id. at 740 (quoting Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 295 A.2d 862, 864 (N.J. 
1972)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 741 (citation omitted). 
 43. Id. 
 44. 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990). 
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concluded that adding a new tort to an area where intrafamily 
disputes are rife would not be in the interests of the affected 
children.45 
2. Government Liability 
Subject to legislative action, the supreme court abolished 
municipal tort immunity in 1962 in Spanel v. Mounds View School 
District No. 621,46 and sovereign immunity in Nieting v. Blondell.47  In 
Nieting, the court explained: 
One of the paramount interests of the members of an 
organized and civilized society is that they be afforded 
protection against harm to their persons, properties, and 
characters.  The logical extension of that interest is that, if 
harm is wrongfully inflicted upon an individual in such a 
society, he should have an opportunity to obtain a 
reasonable and adequate remedy against the wrongdoer, 
either to undo the harm inflicted or to provide 
compensation therefor.  If the state is properly to serve 
the public interest, it must strive, through its laws, to 
achieve the goals of protecting the people and of 
providing them with adequate remedies for injuries 
wrongfully inflicted upon them.  So long as the state fails 
to do so, it will be functioning in conflict with the public 
interest and the public good.48 
The court has read the concept of sovereign immunity restrictively.  
In Wilson v. City of Eagan,49 the supreme court interpreted the 
political subdivision tort claims act to permit a claim for punitive 
damages against municipal officers and employees. 50  The court’s 
analysis was based in part on policy arguments that limited the 
scope of sovereign immunity and permitted the award of punitive 
damages in light of its recognition that sovereign immunity was an 
exception: 
[S]overeign immunity is an exception to the general tort 
rules that one should be liable for the harm one causes 
and for punitive damages in the appropriate case.  
Consequently, sovereign immunity should be treated 
 
 45. Id. at 45–47. 
 46. 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962). 
 47. 306 Minn. 122, 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975). 
 48. Id. at 131, 235 N.W.2d at 602–03. 
 49. 297 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1980). 
 50. Id. at 149–50  (interpreting MINN. STAT. § 466.04, subdiv. 1a (1978)). 
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restrictively so that the underlying purposes and 
philosophy of our tort law, including the provisions for 
punitive damages, can be given effect.  Thus, the statute 
should be read restrictively, not expansively. . . . [T]he 
potential for abuse of power by municipal officers and 
employees in ways that could cause harassment, invasion 
of privacy, or injury to property low in value is great.51 
In Loven v. City of Minneapolis,52 the court reiterated its 
statement in Wilson that the tort liability cap should be read 
restrictively to achieve the underlying purposes and philosophy of 
Minnesota tort law.53  In this case, the court rejected the City of 
Minneapolis’s argument that the $750,000 cap on damages against 
it also included payments of no-fault benefits.54 
But notwithstanding the judicial elimination of sovereign 
immunity and the court’s restrictive application of sovereign 
immunity, there are important limitations on the liability of 
governmental entities and their employees.  Discretionary 
immunity, now called statutory immunity to avoid confusion,55 is 
preserved in the state and municipal tort claims statutes.56  It 
insulates governmental entities from liability for planning-level 
decisions that involve political, economic, or social factors.57  The 
supreme court has consistently interpreted the exception 
narrowly.58 
Most recently, in Schroeder v. St. Louis County,59 the supreme 
court held that a county had statutory immunity for its decision to 
permit the operator of a grading machine to operate a grader 
against traffic, because the decision was a policy-making decision at 
the planning level.  Justice Hanson, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, pointed out that the application of past 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. 639 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. 2002). 
 53. Id. at 872. 
 54. Id. at 873. 
 55. Janklow v. Minn. Bd. of Exam’rs for Nursing Home Adm’rs, 552 N.W.2d 
711, 716 (Minn. 1996). 
 56. See MINN. STAT. §§ 3.736, subdiv. 3(b), 466.03, subdiv. 6 (2004). 
 57. See Schroeder v. St. Louis County, 708 N.W.2d 497, 514 (Minn. 2006); 
Conlin v. City of Saint Paul, 605 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. 2000); Fisher v. County of 
Rock, 596 N.W.2d 646, 652 (Minn. 1999); Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230, 232 
(Minn. 1988). 
 58. See Conlin, 605 N.W.2d at 400; Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit 
Operations, 582 N.W.2d 216, 219 n.5 (Minn. 1998); Angell v. Hennepin County 
Reg’l Rail Auth., 578 N.W.2d 343, 346 (Minn. 1998). 
 59. 708 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 2006). 
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precedent on statutory immunity would result in refusal to consider 
important policy issues involved in such cases.60  Not considering 
these policy issues creates a problem because it allows the county to 
immunize itself from liability by making a cost-benefit judgment: 
A governmental body that is charged with responsibility 
for the safety of the roads should obviously be 
discouraged from creating dangerous conditions on those 
roads.  Further, a governmental body whose conduct 
creates a common law duty to warn its citizens about a 
dangerous condition should not be allowed to unilaterally 
immunize itself from liability by simply engaging in the 
process of weighing the risk of harm to the public against 
some competing policy concerns of the government, 
especially purely economic concerns.  And, because the 
government’s decision to forgo certain expenditures will 
provide benefits to all taxpayers, it is not fair to require a 
single innocent victim to bear all of the cost of the adverse 
consequences of that decision. 
Moreover, if a governmental entity is immune, and 
therefore has no risk of loss for negligent acts, then it has 
nothing to balance against forgoing the expenditure.  
Carried to the extreme, immunity could encourage the 
government to abdicate many of its most important 
responsibilities by making policy decisions to save the 
expenses necessary to execute them.  Could a county, for 
example, allow travelers to continue to use an unsafe 
bridge, without warning, because it weighed the safety of 
the travelers against budget constraints that made it 
financially difficult to make the bridge safe?  One would 
hope not, but the extension of the discretionary function 
exception to the deliberate abdication of governmental 
responsibilities, purely for cost-saving reasons, could 
produce precisely that extreme result. 
In fact, it is anomalous that a governmental body may 
obtain immunity from liability under the discretionary 
function exception by engaging in the very conduct that 
would increase the culpability of a private party.  For 
example, products liability cases routinely hold that a 
product manufacturer who knows of a dangerous 
condition but defers correction by engaging in a cost-
benefit analysis, balancing human lives against corporate 
 
 60. Id. at 513–14 (Hanson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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profits, has demonstrated such “callous indifference to 
public safety” as to be subject to punitive damages.61 
The court has also interposed other limitations on the liability 
of governmental entities and their employees.  Official immunity is 
intended to shield officials from individual liability when their jobs 
call for the exercise of judgment or discretion in the performance 
of their duties, unless they act willfully or maliciously.62  If official 
immunity applies to a government official, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court has made the decision to extend vicarious official immunity 
to the governmental entity employing that official.63  Not all 
jurisdictions have made the same decision, but the court took the 
position in Pletan v. Gaines64 that on balance, and considering the 
deterrence and compensation objectives of tort law, the best policy 
was to apply vicarious official immunity; this avoids the potential 
pressure of tort liability compromising the performance of 
government employees’ official duties because of the threat that 
liability will be imposed on their governmental employer.65  
Vicarious official immunity is routinely applied in the Minnesota 
cases. 
Aside from official and vicarious official immunity, the 
supreme court has created an additional limitation on 
governmental liability in cases where liability turns on statutory 
violations by governmental officials.  The approach, while not 
without criticism,66 precludes liability in cases where government 
 
 61. Id. at 512 (citing Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981)). 
 62. See, e.g., Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. 2006); Thompson v. 
City of Minneapolis, 707 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 2006); Anderson v. Anoka 
Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 655–56 (Minn. 2004); Gleason, 
582 N.W.2d at 220; Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 40 (Minn. 1992); Elwood v. 
Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1988). 
 63. Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1992). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 42–43.  The court’s specific holding was limited to high-speed 
chases by the police and bolstered by what it perceived to be the legislature’s 
implicit recognition of vicarious official immunity in the Crime Victims 
Reparations Act.  Id. at 42 (citing MINN. STAT. § 611A.52, subdiv. 6(c)(3) (1992)).  
Of course, if official immunity is inapplicable to the official, the governmental 
entity will not be able to take advantage of vicarious official immunity.  See Mumm, 
708 N.W.2d at 493 (noting the governmental entity was not protected by vicarious 
official immunity because its employee was not entitled to official immunity). 
 66. See Hage v. Stade, 304 N.W.2d 283, 289 (Minn. 1981) (Scott, J., 
dissenting) (the “majority opinion reintroduces into Minnesota law the 
proposition that ‘the king can do no wrong’ under the guise of the public-duty 
rule”); Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 808–12 (Minn. 1979) 
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has violated a statute creating only a general duty to the public, but 
permits the imposition of liability in cases where a special duty of 
care is owed to the injured person.67  In Radke v. County of Freeborn,68 
a 2005 case arising out of the death of a nineteen-month-old child 
who was beaten to death by a friend of his mother, the supreme 
court held that the county was subject to liability in negligence for 
its investigation of child abuse and neglect reports required by 
Minnesota’s Child Abuse Reporting Act.69 
3. Products Liability 
Minnesota rounded out negligence law in a series of products 
liability cases decided in the 1950s and 1960s,70 and in 1959 the 
court eliminated the privity hurdle in implied warranty of 
merchantability cases.71  Building on those decisions, the supreme 
court followed the national shift to strict liability in tort in 1967 in 
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.,72 even though the theory was not 
directly pled nor instructed on at trial and was urged by the 
plaintiffs for the first time on appeal to the supreme court.73  The 
court followed the standard policy rationale supporting strict 
liability in tort: 
[I]n our view, enlarging a manufacturer’s liability to those 
injured by its products more adequately meets public-
policy demands to protect consumers from the inevitable 
risks of bodily harm created by mass production and 
complex marketing conditions. In a case such as this, 
subjecting a manufacturer to liability without proof of 
negligence or privity of contract, as the rule intends, 
imposes the cost of injury resulting from a defective 
product upon the maker, who can both most effectively 
 
(Kelly, J., dissenting). 
 67. E.g., Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836, 842–43 (Minn. 1986) (finding 
that the Public Welfare Licensing Act created a special duty between the county 
and small children); Cracraft, 279 N.W.2d at 806–08 (holding that the city’s duty of 
inspection pursuant to a local fire ordinance did not create a special duty). 
 68. 694 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 2005). 
 69. MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2004). 
 70. See Rosin v. Int’l Harvester, 262 Minn. 445, 115 N.W.2d 50 (1962); 
Hofstedt v. Int’l Harvester Co., 256 Minn. 453, 98 N.W.2d 808 (1959); Johnson v. 
West Fargo Mfg. Co., 255 Minn. 19, 95 N.W.2d 497 (1959); Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-
Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d 688 (1956). 
 71. Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 563, 99 N.W.2d 670, 683 (1959). 
 72. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
  73. Id. at 340, 154 N.W.2d at 501. 
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reduce or eliminate the hazard to life and health, and 
absorb and pass on such costs, instead of upon the 
consumer, who possesses neither the skill nor the means 
necessary to protect himself adequately from either the 
risk of injury or its disastrous consequences.74 
By 1984, however, strict liability theory had been reeled back 
to a negligence base.  In Bilotta v. Kelley Co.,75 the supreme court 
adopted a risk-utility approach to design-defect cases,76 and three 
years later, in Kallio v. Ford Motor Co.,77 the court, while refusing to 
make the requirement of a feasible alternative part of the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case for proof of a design defect, noted that proof of a 
feasible alternative is nonetheless a relevant and important part of 
proof in design cases.78 
In Germann v. F.L. Smithe Machine Co.,79 the court stated that it 
“has adopted the position that strict liability for failure to warn is 
based upon principles of negligence.”80  The court’s position in 
design-defect and failure-to-warn cases is consistent with the more 
moderate position on those issues taken in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability.81 
The treatment of strict liability theory in Minnesota is 
consistent with negligence theory, which bears out Justice 
Simonett’s observation in Holm v. Sponco Manufacturing, Inc.,82 that 
even in strict liability cases the notion of “wrongness” surfaces in 
any attempt to define what a defect is in a product, certainly under 
a consumer expectation standard83 and, he added later in his 
separate opinion in Bilotta v. Kelley Co.,84 where a risk-utility 
standard is utilized. 
The court’s decision in Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp.85 is a 
good example of just how limiting the application of negligence 
 
 74. Id. at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500. 
 75. 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984). 
 76. Id. at 622. 
 77. 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987). 
 78. Id. at 96–97. 
 79. 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986). 
 80. Id. at 926 n.4.  The court reaffirmed Germann in Huber v. Niagara 
Machine and Tool Works, 430 N.W.2d 465, 468 n.1 (Minn. 1988). 
 81. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (a), (b) 
(1998). 
 82. 324 N.W.2d 207, 213–16 (Minn. 1982) (Simonett, J. concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 83. Id. at 215. 
 84. 346 N.W.2d 616, 625–26 (Minn. 1984). 
 85. 582 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. 1998). 
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principles can be.  The five-year-old plaintiff in the case sustained 
serious injuries when the toboggan he was riding slid under a 
stationary Yamaha Snowscoot snowmobile.86  His face was seriously 
cut by a bracket under the snowmobile, resulting in permanent 
disfigurement.87  The supreme court held that the trial court 
appropriately granted summary judgment to the defendants on the 
basis that there was no duty to guard against the kind of injury that 
the plaintiff sustained because it was not foreseeable as a matter of 
law.88  Even though it acknowledged that the foreseeability issue is a 
jury issue in close cases,89 the court, relying on three non-Minnesota 
decisions from the 1950s and 1960s,90 held that the injury was not 
foreseeable as a matter of law.91 
The supreme court has wrestled with the problem of 
establishing boundaries in products liability.  In 80 South Eighth 
Street Ltd. Partnership v. Carey-Canada,92 the supreme court 
considered whether its previously formulated economic loss 
doctrine93 barred the owner of a building with asbestos-containing 
fireproofing from recovering under negligence or strict liability 
theories for the costs of maintenance, removal, and replacement of 
the fireproofing.  The court had earlier held that economic losses 
arising out of commercial transactions, except claims involving 
personal injury or damage to other property, may not be recovered 
under negligence and strict products liability.94  The economic loss 
doctrine, the court said in Carey-Canada, balances two conflicting 
societal goals.95  One encourages marketplace efficiency through 
the voluntary allocation of economic risks, and the other 
 
 86. Id. at 917. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 919. 
 89. Id. at 918. 
 90. See id. at 918–19. (citing and discussing Schneider v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968); Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F.Supp. 677 (S.D. 
Tex. 1963); Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 329 P.2d 605 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)).  
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, however, questioned the continuing 
validity of Kahn and Hatch in Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1001 (D.C. 
Dir. 1976), because they were inconsistent with the law governing crashworthiness. 
 91. Whiteford, 582 N.W.2d at 919. 
 92. 486 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1992). 
 93. The legislature has twice intervened in the area by adopting statutes 
governing the regulation of economic loss claims.  MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01, 604.101 
(2004).  
 94. Superwood v. Simpelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981), overruled 
by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990). 
 95. 486 N.W.2d at 396. 
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discourages conduct that leads to physical harm.96  The court’s 
dilemma was applying the economic loss doctrine in a case where 
the physical hazard of asbestos exposure was minimized and 
removed, resulting in economic loss.  The court held that the costs 
relating to maintenance, removal, and replacement could be 
recovered in tort, and permitting recovery would advance “both the 
rationale and public policy objectives of tort law and the Uniform 
Commercial Code.”97  The rationale for imposing liability for the 
losses turned on the court’s view of the importance of 
manufacturers’ responsibility in products liability cases and the 
reasonableness of a building owner’s response in attempting to 
avoid or minimize the risk of injury to building occupants.98 
The supreme court at one point limited the availability of 
punitive damages in products liability cases involving property 
damage.  In Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co.,99 the 
supreme court held that punitive damages were not available in an 
action solely for the recovery of injury to property, concluding that 
the “interests implicated in strict liability actions for injury solely to 
property are not so great as to warrant extension of this 
controversial remedy.”100  The court took the same position twelve 
years later in Independent School District No. 622 v. Keene Corp.101  The 
court concluded in those cases that refusing to permit punitive 
damages in products liability cases involving only property damage 
reflects the fact that society places a higher value on the safety of 
persons than it does on the security of property.102 
Eisert and Keene Corp. reflected the court’s “intent to control 
escalating lawsuits and awards in product liability actions where the 
only damage is to property.”103  The supreme court overruled those 
decisions in Jensen v. Walsh,104 relying in part on the punitive 
damages statute, which states that punitive damages are permitted 
where there is deliberate disregard of the rights “or” safety of 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 398. 
 98. Id. 
 99. 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 1982), abrogated by Jensen v. Walsh, 623 N.W.2d 
247 (Minn. 2001). 
 100. Id. at 229. 
 101. 511 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. 1994), overruled by Jensen v. Walsh, 623 N.W.2d 
247 (Minn. 2001). 
 102. Keene Corp., 511 N.W.2d at 732; Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 229. 
 103. Jensen v. Walsh, 623 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Minn. 2001). 
 104. Id. 
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others; 105 this focuses on the conduct of the wrongdoer rather than 
the damage caused, and in part on the purposes of punitive 
damages, which are intended to “punish the perpetrator, to deter 
repeat behavior and to deter others from engaging in similar 
behavior.”106 
4. Strict Liability 
Minnesota has approached strict liability cases cautiously.  The 
supreme court recognized the strict liability principles of Rylands v. 
Fletcher107 in early escape cases,108 but it moved cautiously in later 
strict liability cases.  In Sachs v. Chiat,109 a 1968 case involving 
property damage caused by pile driving concussion, the supreme 
court recognized the early decisions110 but, without establishing 
clear principles for the application of strict liability theory, the 
court concluded that the pile driving could be classified “as an 
inherently dangerous or ultrahazardous activity.”111 
More recently, in two cases involving strict liability issues, the 
court backed away from strict liability based on a risk-utility analysis, 
and without adopting a specific strict liability formulation.  In 
Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co.,112 a case involving a high-voltage 
power line accident that occurred while a man and his son were 
trimming trees in their back yard, the supreme court considered 
the risk in the case so unusual that it invited oral argument on the 
issue of whether strict liability should apply in the case.  The court 
ultimately rejected the theory.  In considering the application of 
the Restatement’s strict liability theory for abnormally dangerous 
activities,113 the court noted that a convincing argument could be 
made for making the utility strictly liable, and that “spreading the 
 
 105. Id. at 251 (construing MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subdiv. 1 (2000)). 
 106. Id. at 251 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)). 
 107. 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (appeal taken from Ex.). 
 108. See Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 158 Minn. 509, 511, 197 N.W. 
971, 972 (1924) (water main); Wiltse v. City of Red Wing, 99 Minn. 255, 260, 109 
N.W. 114, 115 (1906) (reservoir collapse); Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 
Minn. 296, 298, 62 N.W. 336, 336–37 (1895) (groundwater contamination); Cahill 
v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1872) (escape of water from tunnel construction). 
 109. 281 Minn. 540, 162 N.W.2d 243 (1968). 
 110. Id. at 542 n.2, 162 N.W.2d at 245 n.2. 
 111. Id. at 544, 162 N.W.2d at 246. 
 112. 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190 (1976). 
 113. The court worked from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 
(Tent. Draft No. 10 1964). 
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cost of serious injury over all consumers of electricity is equitably 
more appealing.”114  But the court rejected the theory, “persuaded 
by the amicus briefs which detail the severe economic 
consequences which may be sustained by the many small electric 
utilities in the state by the abrupt imposition of such a rule.”115 
Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co.,116 from 1984, held that strict 
liability principles did not apply to a case involving an explosion 
that caused escaping gas from the utility’s gas line.  The court 
followed its decisions in 1907’s Gould v. Winona Gas Co.117 and 
ensuing cases, concluding that strict liability should not apply.  The 
court was unwilling to deviate from that settled precedent. 
The plaintiffs in the case argued that the liability of a gas 
distributor should be governed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
sections 519 and 520.118  The court recognized that it had noted 
those sections in other cases, but that it had done nothing other 
than simply recognize the existence of those provisions.  In 
addition, the court recognized that other jurisdictions had rejected 
strict liability in similar contexts.119 
While recognizing that gas distributors have been held to a 
high standard of care in those jurisdictions, the court also rejected 
strict liability theory on policy grounds.  The court acknowledged 
the high degree of danger involved in cases involving leaking gas, 
and that the insurance rationale that the dissent urged the court to 
adopt was not unattractive; but the court reasoned that if liability 
were imposed, it would be the ratepayers who would absorb the 
cost of loss. 120  The court recognized that the impact of imposing 
strict liability would result in homeowners insurance companies 
shifting the loss they contracted to pay to the gas company, even if 
the gas company were free from negligence.121 
In contrast, the legislature adopted strict liability under the 
Minnesota Environmental Response Act.122  One of the primary 
 
 114. Freguson 307 Minn. at 32, 239 N.W.2d at 193–94.  Although not applying 
strict liability, the court noted that the power company should be held to a “high 
degree of care.”  Id. at 33, 239 N.W.2d at 194 (quoting Anderson v. Eastern Minn. 
Power Co., 197 Minn. 144, 149, 266 N.W. 702, 704 (1936)). 
 115. Id. at 32, 239 N.W.2d at 194. 
 116. 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1984). 
 117. 100 Minn. 258, 111 N.W. 254 (1907). 
 118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1965). 
 119. Mahowald, 344 N.W.2d at 861. 
 120. Id. at 862. 
 121. Id. 
 122. MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.01–.20 (2004). 
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purposes of the Act is to impose strict liability on those who are 
responsible for the release of hazardous substances.123  Section 
115B.04 of the Act provides, subject to certain exceptions, that “any 
person who is responsible for a release or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance from a facility is strictly liable, jointly and 
severally, for” certain response costs and damages resulting from 
the release or threatened release of the hazardous substance.124 
5. Exculpatory Clauses 
Tort and contract law intersect in cases involving exculpatory 
clauses.  Exculpatory clauses are not favored in the law and are 
strictly construed against the party who benefits from the clause.125  
While the Minnesota Supreme Court has upheld exculpatory 
clauses,126 the clauses are not enforceable if they are ambiguous, if 
they release the benefiting party from liability for intentional, 
willful, or wanton acts, or if they are in violation of public policy.127 
In deciding whether an exculpatory clause is in violation of 
public policy, the court considers “(1) whether there was a disparity 
in bargaining power between the parties and (2) the types of 
services being offered or provided, taking into consideration 
whether they are public or essential services.”128  In Yang v. Voyagaire 
Houseboats, Inc.,129 the supreme court held that an exculpatory 
clause in a houseboat rental agreement violated public policy.  
Concluding that Voyagaire was in the position of an innkeeper, the 
court held “that as a matter of public policy, Voyagaire cannot 
circumvent its duty to protect its guests by requiring the guests to 
sign a rental agreement containing an exculpatory clause that 
purports to release Voyagaire from liability for the resort’s 
negligence.”130 
 
 123. State v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 644 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002); Musicland Group, Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 508 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1993) (citing Alan C. Williams, A Legislative History of the Minnesota 
"Superfund" Act, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 851, 858 (1984)). 
 124. MINN. STAT. § 115B.04, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 125. Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Minn. 1982). 
 126. See id. at 926. 
 127. Id. at 923–26. 
 128. Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 783, 789 (Minn. 2005). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 791. 
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6. Landowners’ Duties 
In Peterson v. Balach,131 the supreme court decided to “squarely 
face the issue of why the law relating to the duties of owners and 
occupiers of land to invitees and licensees should not be merged 
with general negligence law.”132  Following the national trend, the 
court held that “[a]n entrant’s status as a ‘licensee,’ or ‘invitee’ is 
no longer controlling, but is one element, among many, to be 
considered in determining the landowner’s liability under ordinary 
standards of negligence.”133 
In Pietila v. Congdon,134 the court made clear that in deciding 
Peterson it did not intend to impose any new duties on landowners.  
The court appears to have returned to settled forms to resolve cases 
involving landowners’ duties.  In Baber v. Dill,135 for example, rather 
than analyzing the landowner’s duty in general negligence terms as 
prescribed by Peterson, the court said that “[a]nalysis of a cause of 
action against a landowner for negligence begins with an inquiry 
into whether the landowner, Dill, owed the invitee, William Baber, 
a duty.”136  The duty standard was drawn from section 343A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts: “A possessor of land is not liable to his 
invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or 
condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, 
unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such 
knowledge or obviousness.”137  The court also established as a 
controlling principle the rule that “[a] possessor of land . . . has no 
duty to an invitee where the anticipated harm involves dangers so 
obvious that no warning is necessary.”138  The rationale for the rule 
“is that ‘no one needs notice of what he knows or reasonably may 
be expected to know.’”139 
The court recognized that there is a fine distinction between 
open and obvious dangerous conditions and activities that the 
 
 131. 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972). 
 132. Id. at 167, 199 N.W.2d at 644. 
 133. Id. at 173, 199 N.W.2d at 647. 
 134. 362 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Minn. 1985). 
 135. 531 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 1995). 
 136. Id. at 495. 
 137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1965).  The court had 
previously quoted section 343 in Peterson v. W.T. Rawleigh Co., 274 Minn. 495, 496–
97, 144 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1966). 
 138. Baber, 531 N.W.2d at 496. 
 139. Id. (quoting Sowles v. Urschel Lab., Inc., 595 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 
1979)). 
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possessor should anticipate will result in harm and those that are so 
open and obvious that the possessor need not anticipate harm, but 
it was a distinction the court chose to make in concluding that “a 
landowner has no duty to an invitee to warn or make safe known 
and obvious conditions when that invitee has assisted in creating 
those conditions.”140  The court held that the defendant owed no 
duty to the plaintiff, stating that “[t]o hold a landowner has a duty 
to warn an invitee of danger created, in part, by that individual is 
untenable.”141 
While the court abandoned the common-law classifications in 
Peterson, status is still relevant.  When status is coupled with 
obviousness of the danger, the court has two mechanisms to 
achieve the control that the common-law classification previously 
provided in the form of specific duty rules governing the status of 
entrants on land. 
7. Landlord-Tenant 
Concerns about unlimited liability have prompted courts to 
limit the liability of landlords for injuries to their tenants.  In 
general, Minnesota follows the common-law rule that landlords are 
not liable to their tenants for injuries caused by defective 
conditions on the leased premises,142 but there are exceptions.  A 
landlord may be held liable for failing to disclose a dangerous 
condition about which the landlord knows or has reason to know if 
the tenant, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not be 
expected to discover the danger;143 for failing to use reasonable 
care in making repairs;144 for failing to use reasonable care to keep 
common areas safe for tenants using those areas;145 or for premises 
that are leased for public use where structural defects or failure to 
take reasonable precautions create a danger for users.146 
Aside from the standard exceptions, the supreme court has 
also been careful to limit the liability of landlords, such as when the 
issue is whether the landlord-tenant relationship is a special 
 
 140. Baber, 531 N.W.2d at 496. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 231 (Minn. 2002). 
 143. Johnson v. O'Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 506, 105 N.W.2d 244, 247 (1960). 
 144. Canada v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 1997). 
 145. Nubbe v. Hardy Cont’l Hotel Sys. of Minn., Inc., 225 Minn. 496, 31 
N.W.2d 332 (1948). 
 146. Lyman v. Hermann, 203 Minn. 225, 229, 280 N.W. 862, 864 (1938). 
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relationship that would justify imposing a duty on the landlord to 
guard against misconduct by a third person.147 The court has also 
refused to impose liability on a landlord for building code 
violations, unless the landlord knew or should have known of the 
violation.148 
8. Duties to Third Persons 
The supreme court has been cautious in approaching the issue 
of duties to third persons,149 whether the issue concerns the duty to 
a person who is in a compromised position150 or the duty to guard 
against the misconduct of a third person.151  The court has taken 
the position that there is generally no duty to act for the protection 
of third persons absent some special relationship,152 either between 
the defendant and plaintiff153 or the defendant and a third person 
 
 147. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 674 (Minn. 2001). 
 148. Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 232 (Minn. 2002). The court said 
that four factors are necessary to establish liability for violations of the Uniform 
Building Code: (1) the landlord or owner knew or should have known of the code 
violation; (2) the landlord or owner failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the 
violation; (3) the injury suffered was the kind the code was meant to prevent; and 
(4) the violation was the proximate cause of the injury or damage.  Id. 
 149. See Funchess, 632 N.W.2d at 674 (“We are generally cautious and 
reluctant to impose a duty to protect between those conducting business with one 
another.”). 
 150. See Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1999) (rejecting host 
liability for a dinner guest who suffered head injury after drinking alcoholic 
beverages); Donaldson v. Young Women's Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 
789 (Minn. 1995) (holding that lodging house owed no duty to prevent residents 
from committing suicide). 
 151. See Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. 1985) (finding no 
basis to impose a duty on a homeowner to protect persons invited to his home 
from the criminal activities of third persons). 
 152. Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Minn. 2005); Clark v. 
Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 707 (Minn. 1996).  See, e.g., Walker v. Kennedy, 338 
N.W.2d 254, 255 (Minn. 1983) (finding no special relationship between owner of 
property where alcohol was provided at a party and a minor who attended the 
party, became intoxicated, and caused injury to a third person); Delgado v. 
Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Minn. 1979) (finding a special relationship 
between hunters using high-powered rifles to warn third-person landowner, if 
aware of his presence).  The special relationships supporting a duty include 
parent-child, master-servant, and owner-licensee relationships and cases where a 
person is in charge of another with dangerous propensities.  Id. at 483–84.  The 
rule is inapplicable in premises liability cases turning on whether there is a 
dangerous condition on the land.  Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 320–21 (Minn. 
2001). 
 153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARMS § 40 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005), covers duties in cases where the person subject 
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who causes the injury.154  The reason for the limited duty turns on 
the older common-law distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance.155 
In cases involving the duty of property owners to prevent the 
misconduct of a third person, the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
emphasized the following policy considerations: 
[C]rime prevention is essentially a government function, 
not a private duty; criminals are unpredictable and bent 
on defeating security measures; and because the issue 
arises where existing security precautions have failed, the 
question will always be whether further security measures 
were required and a property owner will have little idea 
what is expected of him or her.156 
 
to liability is in a special relationship with the person who sustains injury.  It reads 
as follows: 
(a) An actor in a special relationship with another owes the other a duty 
of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the 
relationship. 
(b) Special relationships giving rise to the duty provided in Subsection 
(a) include: 
(1) a common carrier with its passengers, 
(2) an innkeeper with its guests, 
(3) a business or other possessor of land that holds its premises open 
to the public with those who are lawfully on the premises, 
(4) an employer with its employees who are: 
(a) in imminent danger; or 
(b) injured and thereby helpless, 
(5) a school with its students, 
(6) a landlord with its tenants, and 
(7) a custodian with those in its custody, if: a) the custodian is 
required by law to take custody or voluntarily takes custody of the 
other; and b) the custodian has a superior ability to protect the 
other. 
 154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARMS § 41 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005), covers duties in cases where the person subject 
to liability is in a special relationship with the person who causes the injury.  It 
reads as follows: 
(a) An actor in a special relationship with another owes a duty of 
reasonable care to third persons with regard to risks posed by the other 
that arise within the scope of the relationship. 
(b) Special relationships giving rise to the duty provided in Subsection 
(a) include: 
(1) a parent with dependent children, 
(2) a custodian with those in its custody, 
(3) an employer with employees when the employment facilitates 
the employee’s causing harm to third parties, and 
(4) a mental-health professional with patients. 
 155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314, cmt. c (1965). 
 156. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 673 n.4 (Minn. 2001) 
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In other cases, the court has emphasized that absent a vulnerable 
plaintiff who is dependent on the defendant,157 the defendant is 
simply not in a position to protect the plaintiff and cannot 
reasonably be expected to do so.158 
Duties to third persons have also been restricted in cases 
involving professional malpractice.  In cases involving legal 
malpractice, the plaintiff must ordinarily establish the existence of 
an attorney-client relationship in order to be entitled to recover 
against the attorney.159  There is a limited exception for cases where 
the sole purpose of a client in retaining an attorney is to directly 
benefit a third party.160 
9. Medical Negligence 
In general, the supreme court has been moderate in medical 
negligence cases.  The modified locality rule applies to medical 
negligence actions.161  Specialists are held to a national standard of 
care.162 
In 1977, in Cornfeldt v. Tongen,163 the Minnesota Supreme Court 
followed the national trend in recognizing a cause of action for 
negligent nondisclosure of risks related to the proposed treatment 
or alternatives to that treatment.  In Pratt v. University of Minnesota 
Affiliated Hospitals,164 a case involving a genetic diagnosis, the court 
noted that the right of a patient to know is not limited to choice of 
treatment after a disease is present and conclusively diagnosed, 
since there are important decisions that must be made in many 
non-treatment cases where medical care is given, “including 
procedures leading to a diagnosis,” but that “mere diagnosis, 
without more, does not give rise to a duty to disclose risks 
concerning conditions not diagnosed.”165 
But if there is negligent diagnosis, the supreme court held in 
 
(citing Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Minn. 1989)). 
 157. See Donaldson v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 
789, 792 (Minn. 1995). 
 158. Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127, 131–32 (Minn. 1999). 
 159. Pine Island Farmers Coop v. Erstad & Riemer, P.A., 649 N.W.2d 444, 448 
(Minn. 2002). 
 160. Id. at 448 n.4; Marker v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Minn. 1981). 
 161. Lundgren v. Eustermann, 370 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1985). 
 162. McCormack v. Lindberg, 352 N.W.2d 30, 36 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). 
 163. 262 N.W.2d 684, 699 (Minn. 1977). 
 164. 414 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. 1987). 
 165. Id. at 402. 
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Molloy v. Meier,166 a case of first impression decided in 2004, that “a 
physician’s duty regarding genetic testing and diagnosis extends 
beyond the patient to biological parents who foreseeably may be 
harmed by a breach of that duty.”167 
In negligence actions, including medical negligence, the 
plaintiff has the burden of proving the elements168 of the case by a 
preponderance of the evidence, including proof that the 
defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injuries.169  The 
supreme court has been reluctant to deviate from those 
requirements.  Two examples involve res ipsa loquitur and loss of a 
chance theory. 
In Ybarra v. Spangard,170 a 1944 California Supreme Court case, 
the court applied res ipsa loquitur171 in a divided control case in 
which it was not clear which of the set of defendants who might 
have caused the plaintiff’s injury were responsible.172  The court 
shifted to the defendants the burden of explaining which of them 
was responsible.173  The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the 
application of Ybarra in Hoven v. Rice Memorial Hospital 174 because of 
its concern that “[a]doption of that analysis would put the burden 
on the defendants to show how plaintiff’s injury occurred and that 
the injury was caused by no negligence on the part of any team 
member—in most cases creating what would amount to absolute 
 
 166. 679 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. 2004). 
 167. Id. at 719. 
 168. See Plutshack v. Univ. of Minn. Hosps., 316 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1982) 
(observing that to establish a prima facie case a plaintiff must prove by expert 
testimony “(1) the standard of care recognized by the medical community as 
applicable to the particular defendant’s conduct, (2) that the defendant in fact 
departed from that standard, and (3) that the defendant’s departure from the 
standard was a direct cause of [the] injuries”). 
 169. See Walton v. Jones, 286 N.W.2d 710, 715 (Minn. 1979). 
 170. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944). 
 171. The Minnesota Supreme Court set out the elements of res ipsa loquitur in 
Spannaus v. Otolaryngology Clinic, 308 Minn. 334, 337, 242 N.W.2d 594, 596 (1976): 
[B]efore a plaintiff is entitled to submit his claim to the jury on the 
theory of res ipsa loquitur, he must establish three things with regard to 
the injury-producing event: (1) The event must be of a kind which 
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it 
must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive 
control of the defendant; and (3) it must not have been due to any 
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. 
 172. Ybarra, 154 P.2d at 687. 
 173. Id. at 691. 
 174. 396 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1986). 
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liability.”175 
In some cases, a physician may be negligent in failing to 
diagnose a patient’s disease and the patient ultimately dies from 
the disease.  Under the traditional rule, the plaintiff is unable to 
prove that the physician’s negligence was more probably than not a 
cause of the death, even though the physician’s negligence may 
have deprived the patient of a substantial chance of survival.176  A 
majority of jurisdictions have accepted the loss of a chance 
theory,177 but the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the theory in 
Fabio v. Bellomo.178 
Claims for wrongful birth, life, and conception have been 
cutting-edge torts.  The claims arise in cases where the defendant 
physician failed to provide expecting parents with information 
concerning the likelihood that their child would be born with 
serious birth defects.  In such cases, the child is born with serious 
birth defects and the mother makes a claim for wrongful birth, and 
the child makes a claim for wrongful life.  While the child’s claim 
for wrongful life is routinely denied,179 most jurisdictions that have 
considered the issue have allowed the claim for wrongful birth by 
the mother.180  Minnesota bars both wrongful life actions and 
wrongful birth actions by statute because of the legislative concern 
over permitting any action based on a claim that the fetus would 
have been aborted.181  In Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,182 the 
 
 175. Id. at 573. 
 176. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 178 (2000). 
 177. Tory A. Weigand, Loss of Chance in Medical Malpractice: A Look at Recent 
Developments, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 301, 301 (2003).  In Smith v. Parrott, 833 A.2d 843, 
846 (Vt. 2003), the Vermont Supreme Court rejected the loss of a chance theory, 
noting that there is also substantial support for the traditional approach.  Id. 
 178. 504 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1993). 
 179. See DOBBS, supra note 176, § 291.  Courts permitting a child to recover for 
a wrongful life claim limit recovery to medical expenses that would otherwise have 
been recoverable by the parents in a wrongful birth action.  Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. MINN. STAT. § 145.424, subdivs. 1, 2 (2004), reads as follows: 
Subdivision 1. Wrongful life action prohibited. No person shall maintain 
a cause of action or receive an award of damages on behalf of that person 
based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, the 
person would have been aborted. 
Subd. 2. Wrongful birth action prohibited. No person shall maintain a 
cause of action or receive an award of damages on the claim that but for 
the negligent conduct of another, a child would have been aborted. 
In Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 723 (Minn. 2004), the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that the statute did not bar a mother’s claim for negligent 
failure to diagnose a genetic condition.  The mother argued that her claim should 
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Minnesota Supreme Court held that the lack of a common-law 
remedy for wrongful birth and life dictated the conclusion that the 
issue was in the exclusive province of the legislature183 and upheld 
the statute against constitutional challenges based on Fourteenth 
Amendment equal protection and Article I, section 8, of the 
Minnesota Constitution.184 
Prior to the adoption of that legislation barring wrongful life 
and wrongful birth actions, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
recognized an action for wrongful conception in Sherlock v. 
Stillwater Clinic.185  The legislature specifically preserved the 
wrongful conception action,186 obviously in response to Sherlock.187 
10.   Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Invasion of 
Privacy – The New Torts 
In recent years, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted two 
new causes of action: intentional infliction of emotional distress in 
1983, in Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc.,188 and invasion of 
privacy in 1998, in Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.189  Compared with 
 
not be prohibited because had she received the necessary information she would 
have sought a tubal ligation, not an abortion.  Id. at 722. 
 182. 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986). 
 183. Id. at 13. 
 184. Id. at 13–14. 
 185. 260 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn. 1977).  The court held that damages in 
wrongful conception actions “may include all prenatal and postnatal medical 
expenses, the mother's pain and suffering during pregnancy and delivery, and loss 
of consortium,” and that “the parents may recover the reasonable costs of rearing 
the unplanned child subject to offsetting the value of the child's aid, comfort, and 
society during the parents' life expectancy.”  Id. at 170–71. 
 186. Minnesota Statutes section 145.424, subdivision 3 (2004), reads as follows: 
Subd. 3.  Failure or refusal to prevent a live birth.  Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to preclude a cause of action for intentional or 
negligent malpractice or any other action arising in tort based on the 
failure of a contraceptive method or sterilization procedure or on a claim 
that, but for the negligent conduct of another, tests or treatment would 
have been provided or would have been provided properly which would 
have made possible the prevention, cure, or amelioration of any disease, 
defect, deficiency, or handicap; provided, however, that abortion shall 
not have been deemed to prevent, cure, or ameliorate any disease, 
defect, deficiency, or handicap. The failure or refusal of any person to 
perform or have an abortion shall not be a defense in any action, nor 
shall that failure or refusal be considered in awarding damages or in 
imposing a penalty in any action. 
 187. See Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 14 n.5. 
 188. 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983). 
 189. 582 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998). 
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when these causes of action were adopted in other states, the court 
came late in both instances.  Since the adoption of those torts, 
however, the court has kept a tight rein on them.  In Hubbard, the 
court emphasized the high threshold of proof necessary to establish 
the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,190 a cue the 
courts have taken to heart, making such a claim exceptionally 
difficult to win,191 and to date the court has not broadly interpreted 
the boundaries of the invasion of privacy tort.192 
11.  Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Negligent infliction of emotional distress claims provide an 
interesting indication of the court’s reluctance to extend tort 
liability.  The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a liberal zone-of-
danger rule in 1892 in Purcell v. St. Paul City Railway,193 and it has 
continued to adhere to that rule.194  In 1980, in Stadler v. Cross,195 
the court rejected the more liberal bystander recovery rule, initially 
adopted by the California Supreme Court in 1968,196 in favor of the 
zone of danger rule.  The court emphasized the importance of 
establishing limitations on negligent infliction of emotional distress 
claims that are “workable, reasonable, logical, and just as 
possible.”197  The court rejected arguments that the bystander 
recovery rule would result in a proliferation of claims or increase 
the potential for fraudulent claims and create unduly burdensome 
liability,198 but it was concerned about establishing workable limits 
for the tort – limits that could be consistently and meaningfully 
applied by courts and juries.199 
More recently, in Engler v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.,200 the 
supreme court considered the issue of whether a mother, who was 
 
 190. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439. 
 191. See Langeslag v. KYMN, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 860, 864–70 (Minn. 2003); 
Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Emotional Distress Claims in Minnesota, 19 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 36–37 (1993). 
 192. See Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553–54 
(Minn. 2003). 
 193. 48 Minn. 134, 139, 50 N.W. 1034, 1035 (1892). 
 194. See Michael Steenson, Engler v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. and 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1335 (2006). 
 195. 295 N.W.2d 552, 554–55 (Minn. 1980). 
 196. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). 
 197. 295 N.W.2d at 554. 
 198. Id. at 555 n.3. 
 199. Id. at 554. 
 200. 706 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005). 
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in the zone of danger and suffered emotional distress as a result of 
fear for the safety of her son who was hit by a car, should be 
entitled to recover for her emotional distress in witnessing her 
son’s injuries.201  The court was not asked to reconsider Stadler and 
the zone of danger rule, but it was asked to expand the damages 
that are recoverable beyond earlier statements of the zone of 
danger rule apparently confining recovery to damages for fear for 
one’s own safety.202 
The court in Engler held that “a plaintiff may recover damages 
for distress caused by fearing for another’s safety or witnessing 
serious injury to another” if the plaintiff proves she “(1) was in the 
zone of danger of physical impact; (2) had an objectively 
reasonable fear for her own safety; (3) had severe emotional 
distress with attendant physical manifestations; and (4) stands in a 
close relationship to the third-party victim.”203  The court also 
added a fifth requirement: “the plaintiff also must establish that the 
defendant’s negligent conduct—the conduct that created an 
unreasonable risk of physical injury to the plaintiff—caused serious 
bodily injury to the third-party victim.”204  The court chose not to 
define what sort of “close relationship” is necessary to support 
recovery, preferring to leave the issue open for case-by-case 
development.205 
The case is interesting in part because of the rhetoric 
surrounding the issue.  Facially, it seemed to be noncontroversial.  
A mother suffered severe emotional distress when she witnessed 
her son being hit and seriously injured by a car. 206  She was also 
placed in harm’s way in the accident. 207  It might be surprising that 
the question would narrow to whether the emotional distress 
should somehow be parsed, with her recovery limited only to 
emotional distress that she suffered because of fear for her own 
safety, but the usual “sky is falling” arguments of excessive litigation 
and undue expansion of liability were made, sharpening the issue 
and requiring supreme court attention to resolve it.208  The court 
rejected the arguments but thought it was important to emphasize 
 
 201. Id. at 765–66. 
 202. Id. at 767–68. 
 203. Id. at 770. 
 204. Id. at 770–71. 
 205. Id. at 772. 
 206. Id. at 766. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 765. 
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in its opinion that it was not creating a new cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases, but only expanding 
the damages that could be awarded to a person who was already in 
the zone of danger when she witnessed injury to her son.209 
12.  Defenses 
The supreme court’s consideration of defenses to negligence 
claims has of course been in the context of comparative negligence 
or fault, since the comparative negligence statute was enacted in 
1969.  The supreme court has stated that it has liberally applied 
comparative fault principles210 in applying a flexible fault standard 
to the negligence of children,211 or in disallowing the defense in 
cases involving very small children.212  The court has also held that 
comparative fault principles are inapplicable in cases where the 
defense of contributory negligence would be inconsistent with the 
defendant’s statutory213 or common-law obligations.214  Liberal, in 
that sense, means restricting the availability of contributory 
negligence in certain cases. 
On the other hand, the court has also construed the statute in 
ways that severely restrict an injured person’s right to recover.  The 
Comparative Fault Act requires a comparison of the fault of the 
injured person to the fault of the person against whom recovery is 
sought.215  The supreme court has construed the Act to require 
individual and not aggregate comparisons of fault.216  The only 
clear exception is for cases where the defendants are engaged in a 
joint venture.217  In addition, the court requires the fault of all 
 
 209. Id. at 771. 
 210. Tomfohr v. Mayo Found., 450 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Minn. 1990). 
 211. See Toetschinger v. Ihnot, 312 Minn. 59, 63–65, 250 N.W.2d 204, 207–08 
(1977). 
 212. See Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 743 (Minn. 1980) 
(upholding the trial court’s determination that a child aged four years and one-
and-a-half months could not be negligent as a matter of law). 
 213. See Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 140–41, 210 N.W.2d 58, 63 (1973) 
(sale of glue to minor in violation of statute). 
 214. See Sandborg v. Blue Earth County, 615 N.W.2d 61, 64 (Minn. 2000) 
(jailer’s duty to protect detainee from risk of suicide); Tomfohr, 450 N.W.2d at 123 
(health care provider’s duty to patient known to be suicidal). 
 215. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 216. Cambern v. Sioux Tools, Inc., 323 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1982).  The 
jury found the plaintiff was thirty-five percent at fault, the manufacturer of the tool 
she was using when injured twenty percent at fault, and the plaintiff’s employer, 
Bayliner Boats, forty-five percent at fault.  Id. 
 217. See Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 295 Minn. 200, 208, 203 
6. STEENSON - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC 12/15/2006  1:30:01 PM 
2006] THE MINNESOTA TORT SYSTEM 271 
parties to the “transaction” to be compared, even if a party to the 
transaction is not a party to the lawsuit. 218  The two rules, in 
combination, significantly restrict the right of the injured person to 
recover in cases involving multiple parties. 
13.  Vicarious Liability 
The supreme court’s acceptance of vicarious liability, a rule of 
strict liability, is not based on an employer’s fault, but rather “a 
public policy determination that liability for acts committed within 
the scope of employment should be allocated to the employer as a 
cost of engaging in that business.”219  The standard for making the 
vicarious liability determination is whether (1) “the source of the 
attack is related to the duties of the employee,” and (2) “the assault 
occurs within work-related limits of time and place.”220  In cases 
involving intentional torts, the supreme court held that it was 
unnecessary that the employee act in furtherance of the employer’s 
interests for it to be vicariously liable.221  Employers may also be 
directly liable under negligent hiring,222 retention,223 or 
supervision224 theories in cases where an employee commits a tort 
that results in injury to third persons. 
14.  Summary 
As the cases illustrate, the supreme court has relied on an array 
of policy reasons in sorting out its torts decisions.  Which policy 
concerns are relevant is issue-dependent.  Aside from noting the 
compensatory and deterrence objectives of tort law, the court’s 
decisions often turn on the sometimes explicitly stated and 
sometimes implicit policy of ensuring personal accountability 
 
N.W.2d 841, 846 (1973). 
 218. Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Minn. 1986). 
 219. Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 910 
(Minn. 1999). 
 220. Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 404, 211 N.W.2d 783, 786 
(1973). 
 221. Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 
N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 1982). 
 222. Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983). 
 223. J.M. v. Minn. Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, 658 N.W.2d 589, 597 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Olson v. First Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254, 264 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003), citing Yunker v. Honeywell, Inc., 496 N.W.2d 419, 423 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 224. Semrad v. Edina Realty, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 528, 533–34 (Minn. 1992). 
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through the tort system.  In some cases, the focus may be on 
whether a certain class of persons would be superior cost bearers, 
as in the court’s strict liability cases.  Other policies, relevant in 
duty determinations, include the administrative workability of a 
rule or the social costs of a particular liability rule.  The court may 
also be motivated by its understanding of the need for constraint in 
cases where tort and contract law intersect.  There is no single 
theory of tort liability that has driven the court’s decisions, an 
unsurprising finding given case-by-case structuring of common law 
rules.  The nature of judicial decision-making, spanning time, 
changing social conditions, and continually shifting court 
composition make it difficult to characterize the body of a court’s 
work with labels.  The court has sometimes expanded the right to 
recovery when, for example, it abrogates immunities, and 
sometimes contracted it, as when it concluded that strict liability is 
limited by negligence principles in products liability cases.  Both a 
liberal label, in the sense of enhancing tort remedies, and a 
conservative label, in the sense of contracting tort remedies or 
maintaining the status quo, might potentially be applicable, 
depending on the area of law being considered. 
III.  LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
A recent study by the Pacific Research Institute establishes 
indexes that evaluate the condition of the tort system in each state 
relative to the tort systems in the other states and ranks them in 
order of the success of the degree of tort reform they have 
achieved. 225 
The foreword to the report, written by former Michigan 
Governor John Engler, states that the study confirms that “the 
health of a state’s civil-justice system is a key indicator of its 
economic vitality and potential for future growth,” and that “[a] 
fair, stable, and predictable legal environment is critical to a state’s 
ability to attract investment, draw new businesses, and generate new 
jobs.”226  The concern is that “unfair and outdated liability laws 
reward lawsuit abuse, impede job creation, and impose higher costs 
on everything consumers buy–from new cars to medical care.”227  
 
 225. LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & HOVANNES ABRAMYAN, U.S. TORT LIABILITY 
INDEX: 2006 REPORT (2006). 
 226.  John Engler, Introduction to MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 225, at 1. 
 227.  Id. 
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The foreword similarly emphasizes the importance of law reform in 
promoting “stronger economic growth and higher personal 
income.”228  Noting that the goal of tort law is “to efficiently deter 
wrongdoers and fully compensate unjustly injured victims,” the 
report states that achieving that balance in the system eliminates 
meritless litigation and excessive awards.229 
The report, considering all results, divides states into three 
groups: saints, sinners, and salvageable.  The “sinners” category 
includes states that are likely to fall in future rankings because they 
have relatively high monetary tort losses and significant threats, but 
yet have few, if any, comprehensive reforms.  Minnesota falls 
somewhere in the middle, while it ranked forty-fifth in substantive 
law rules and reforms.230 
The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) publishes a 
Tort Reform Record twice a year. 231  It focuses on various areas, 
including joint and several liability, the collateral source rule, 
punitive damages reform, noneconomic damage reform, 
prejudgment interest, product liability reform, class action reform, 
attorney retention sunshine, appeal bond reform, and jury service 
reform. 232  The preferred positions would lead to cutbacks on the 
availability of tort remedies.  The Association is dedicated to 
reforming the tort system, for reasons similar to those of the Pacific 
Research Study.233 
The pro-tort-reform responses to imbalance are based on 
limited views of the system.  There is no general analysis of the 
structure of tort law in each jurisdiction.  Rather, the studies focus 
on the most obvious and easiest to illustrate points in a legal 
system.  Either there is or is not reform, with the focus on specific, 
perhaps more visible points on the torts continuum.  Gaining a full 
understanding of the status of reform in individual states requires 
 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  MCQUILLAN & ABRAMYAN, supra note 225, at 15. 
 230. Id. at 65, Table 8.  The substantive law rules and reforms considered in 
the report include: class action reform, contingency attorney-fee limits; whether 
the state generally uses a contributory, comparative, or modified comparative 
negligence standard; joint and several liability reform; attorney fee limitations; 
conditions on the use of expert witnesses; pre-trial screening or arbitration; and 
products liability reform.  Id. at 30–31, table 2. 
 231.  ATRA, TORT REFORM RECORD 1 (July 10, 2006), at http://www.atra.org/ 
files .cgi/7990_Record7-06.pdf. 
 232.  Id. 
 233. See ATRA, At a Glance, http://www.atra.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 8, 
2006). 
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more than a litmus test.  The following discussion puts legislative 
reform in Minnesota in a broader context in order to provide a 
more accurate means of assessing Minnesota legislative reform. 
Legislative interventions have had a significant impact in 
shaping Minnesota tort law.  Perhaps the most significant legislative 
reform was the 1913 adoption of the Workers’ Compensation 
Act,234 which substituted a no-fault compensation scheme for the 
prior tort liability regime in cases involving workplace injuries.  The 
Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act,235 which became 
effective in 1975, made automobile insurance mandatory,236 added 
a new form of insurance, basic economic loss insurance,237 and 
imposed limitations, called tort thresholds,238 on the right to 
recover for non-economic detriment in actions against insured 
drivers.  No-fault automobile insurance was a response to perceived 
inequities in automobile accident litigation.  The legislature’s 
statement of purpose provides the justification: 
The detrimental impact of automobile accidents on 
uncompensated injured persons, upon the orderly and 
efficient administration of justice in this state, and in 
various other ways requires that sections 65B.41 to 65B.71 
be adopted to effect the following purposes: 
(1) to relieve the severe economic distress of 
uncompensated victims of automobile accidents 
within this state by requiring automobile insurers to 
offer and automobile owners to maintain automobile 
insurance policies or other pledges of indemnity 
which will provide prompt payment of specified basic 
economic loss benefits to victims of automobile 
accidents without regard to whose fault caused the 
accident; 
(2) to prevent the overcompensation of those 
automobile accident victims suffering minor injuries 
by restricting the right to recover general damages to 
cases of serious injury; 
(3) to encourage appropriate medical and 
rehabilitation treatment of the automobile accident 
victim by assuring prompt payment for such 
 
 234. See MINN. STAT. §§ 176.001–.862 (2004). 
 235. Id. §§ 65B.41–.71 (2004). 
 236. Id. § 65B.49, subdiv. 1. 
 237. Id. § 65B.44. 
 238. Id. § 65B.51, subdiv. 3. 
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treatment; 
(4) to speed the administration of justice, to ease the 
burden of litigation on the courts of this state, and to 
create a system of small claims arbitration to decrease 
the expense of and to simplify litigation, and to 
create a system of mandatory intercompany 
arbitration to assure a prompt and proper allocation 
of the costs of insurance benefits between motor 
vehicle insurers; 
(5) to correct imbalances and abuses in the operation 
of the automobile accident tort liability system, to 
provide offsets to avoid duplicate recovery, to require 
medical examination and disclosure, and to govern 
the effect of advance payments prior to final 
settlement of liability.239 
On occasion, the legislature supplements the common law by 
permitting recovery for damages in certain cases where the 
common law barred recovery.  The Wrongful Death Act240 permits 
recovery of pecuniary loss “for the exclusive benefit of the surviving 
spouse and next of kin.”241  The common law rule was that the 
cause of action died with the person.242  The legislature initially 
capped damages in wrongful death cases, but those caps have been 
eliminated. 
The Civil Damage Act243 provides a cause of action for “[a] 
spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured 
in person, property, or means of support, or who incurs other 
pecuniary loss by an intoxicated person or by the intoxication of 
another person . . . against a person who caused the intoxication of 
 
 239. Id. § 65B.42.  See also MICHAEL K. STEENSON & MICHAEL FARGIONE, 
MINNESOTA NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE, ch. 1 (3d ed. 2005) (providing a 
more detailed analysis of the history of no-fault insurance in Minnesota). 
 240. MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (2004). 
 241. Id., subdiv. 1.  The survival statute, Minnesota Statutes section 573.01 
(2004), provided that “[a] cause of action arising out of an injury to the person 
dies with the person of the party in whose favor it exists, except as provided in 
section 573.02,” and that “[a]ll other causes of action by one against another, 
whether arising on contract or not, survive to the personal representatives of the 
former and against those of the latter.”  MINN. STAT. § 573.01 (2004).  The original 
survival statute was drawn verbatim from the territorial survival statute.  See Lavalle 
v. Kaupp, 240 Minn. 360, 361–62, 61 N.W.2d 228, 229–30 (1953) (setting out 
history of the survival statute). 
 242. See Eklund v. Evans, 211 Minn. 164, 167, 300 N.W. 617, 619 (1941). 
 243. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (2004). 
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that person by illegally selling alcoholic beverages.”244  The Act 
applies to persons who are in the business of selling alcohol,245 
although the legislature has permitted two forms of social host 
action, one common law246 and one statutory,247 in cases where a 
social host provides or furnishes alcohol to a minor. 
A. 1978 Reforms 
To achieve a broader picture of legislative reform of the tort 
system in Minnesota, however, the next part of this discussion 
focuses on legislative reformation of the tort system over the past 
approximately thirty years.  The first broad set of reforms aimed at 
the tort system was enacted by the legislature in 1978, although in 
retrospect, the effectiveness of the reforms is questionable.  The 
1978 reforms were focused in part on products liability law and 
included the adoption of a four-year statute of limitations for strict 
liability claims arising out of the “manufacture, sale, use or 
consumption of a product,”248 and a two-year statute of limitations 
for claims against persons who apply pesticides.249 
The 1978 reforms also included a limitation on pleading 
damages: 
In a pleading in a civil action which sets forth an 
unliquidated claim for relief, whether an original claim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, if a recovery of money is 
demanded in an amount less than $50,000, the amount 
shall be stated. If a recovery of money in an amount 
greater than $50,000 is demanded, the pleading shall state 
merely that recovery of reasonable damages in an amount 
greater than $50,000 is sought.250 
The statute imposes no limitations on damages, but only a 
limitation on pleading.  It limits whatever adverse impact the 
pleading of large sums of damages has on the public’s perception 
 
 244. Id., subdiv. 1.  The action is limited to cases arising out of the commercial 
sale of alcohol. 
 245. Koehnen v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn. 1999). 
 246. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801, subdiv. 6 (2004).  See also  Michael K. Steenson, 
With the Legislature's Permission and the Supreme Court's Consent, Common Law Social 
Host Liability Returns to Minnesota, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 45 (1995) (analyzing 
social host liability). 
 247. MINN. STAT. § 340A.90 (2004). 
 248. Id § 541.05, subdiv. 2. 
 249. Id. § 541.07 (7). 
 250. Id. § 544.36. 
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of the civil justice system. 
The legislature adopted comparative negligence in 1969, 251 
doing away with the all-or-nothing rule of contributory negligence.  
Recovery was barred only if the percentage of negligence assigned 
to the person seeking recovery was equal to or greater than the 
negligence of the person against whom recovery was sought.252  The 
1978 legislation, 253 modeled in part on the Uniform Comparative 
Fault Act,254 made significant changes in the law.  It provided for 
the comparison of fault, rather than negligence.  It also shifted to 
the Wisconsin-modified form of comparative fault, in which a 
person is barred from recovery only if that person’s fault is greater 
than the fault of the person from whom recovery is sought, giving 
the tiebreaker to the plaintiff.255  The amendment also limited joint 
and several liability in Minnesota for the first time256 by adopting a 
loss reallocation provision that required any uncollectible loss to be 
reallocated among all the remaining at-fault parties to the 
litigation.257  The rationale was that uncollectible amounts should 
not be the sole responsibility of jointly and severally liable 
tortfeasors in cases where the plaintiff was also at fault. 
The legislation retained an exception for products liability 
cases, however.  In cases where part of a judgment is not collectible 
from a party in the chain of manufacture and distribution, the 
uncollectible amount is reallocated only among the other parties in 
the chain of manufacture and distribution, and not to the 
plaintiff.258 
The 1978 reforms also included a useful life statute,259 which 
provides that it “is a defense to a claim against a designer, 
manufacturer, distributor or seller of the product or a part thereof, 
that the injury was sustained following the expiration of the 
ordinary useful life of the product.”260  A product’s useful life “is not 
 
 251. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 6–7, 1978 Minn. Laws 839–40. 
 254. See Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 101–02 (Minn. 1983). 
 255. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 256. See Michael K. Steenson, Joint and Several Liability Minnesota Style, 15 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 969 (1989) (discussing history of joint and several liability). 
 257. Id. § 604.02, subdiv. 2. 
 258. MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 3 (2004). 
 259. Id. § 604.03. 
 260. Id., subdiv. 1. The statute stops short of being a statute of repose, which 
would set a specified date after the sale of a product after which liability cannot be 
imposed for injuries caused by the product. 
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necessarily the life inherent in the product, but is the period 
during which with reasonable safety the product should be useful 
to the user.”261  In Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,262 the 
supreme court in effect rendered the statute a non-factor in 
holding that “the expiration of a product’s useful life under section 
604.03 is a factor to be weighed by the jury in determining the fault 
of the manufacturer and the fault of the user.”263 
The reforms included a notice statute requiring “[t]he 
attorney for a person who intends to claim damage for or on 
account of personal injury, death or property damage arising out of 
the manufacture, sale, use or consumption of a product” to provide 
“a notice of possible claim stating the time, place and 
circumstances of events giving rise to the claim and an estimate of 
compensation or other relief to be sought.”264  Failure to provide 
notice does not affect the validity of the claim, but may subject a 
person who fails to give notice to a claim for damages, costs, and 
attorneys fees.265  To date, there are no reported decisions 
indicating that sanctions have been imposed under this section for 
failure to provide the necessary notice. 
A major part of the 1978 reform legislation was the initial 
punitive damages statute providing that “[p]unitive damages shall 
be allowed in civil actions only upon clear and convincing evidence 
that the acts of the defendant show a willful indifference to the 
rights or safety of others.”266  The statute also specified under what 
circumstances punitive damages can properly be awarded against a 
master or principal because of an act done by an agent.267  The 
statute was amended in the 1990 reform legislation, which retained 
the clear and convincing evidence standard while modifying the 
standards necessary for imposition of punitive damages.268 
The 1978 reform legislation also included a bad faith statute, 
which allowed the district court, upon motion of a party prevailing 
as to an issue in a civil action, in its discretion to award that party 
 
 261. Id., subdiv. 2. 
 262. 426 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1988). 
 263. Id. at 832. 
 264. MINN. STAT. § 604.04, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 265. Id., subdiv. 3. 
 266. Act of April 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 4, 1978 Minn. Laws 838 (amending MINN. 
STAT. § 549.20). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 555, §§ 15–18, 1990 Minn. Laws 1563–64 
(amending MINN. STAT. § 549.20). 
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costs, disbursements, reasonable attorney fees, and witness fees 
relating to the issue, if the party or attorney against whom costs, 
disbursements, reasonable attorney fees, and witness fees are 
charged, acted in bad faith with respect to that issue.269  The statute 
was repealed and merged into a new bad faith statute, section 
549.211, in 1997.270 
The final piece of the reform legislation was a $400,000 cap on 
damages for loss of consortium, emotional distress, or 
embarrassment.271  It was repealed in 1990 as part of that year’s tort 
reform package. 
B. 1980 Reforms 
In 1980, the legislature modified products liability law by 
enacting a statute that limited the liability of parties, other than the 
manufacturer, in the chain of manufacture and distribution.272  
 
 269. MINN. STAT. § 549.21, repealed by Act of May 22, 1997, ch. 213, art. 2, § 6, 
1997 Minn. Laws 1924. 
 270. MINN. STAT. § 549.211 (2004). 
 271. Id. § 549.23 (1988), repealed by Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 555, § 23, 1990 
Minn. Laws 1565. 
 272. Minnesota Statutes section 544.41 (2004), reads as follows: 
Subdivision 1. Product liability; requirements. In any product liability 
action based in whole or in part on strict liability in tort commenced or 
maintained against a defendant other than the manufacturer, that party 
shall upon answering or otherwise pleading file an affidavit certifying the 
correct identity of the manufacturer of the product allegedly causing 
injury, death or damage. The commencement of a product liability 
action based in whole or part on strict liability in tort against a certifying 
defendant shall toll the applicable statute of limitation relative to the 
defendant for purposes of asserting a strict liability in tort cause of action. 
Subd. 2. Certifying defendant; dismissal of strict liability. Once the 
plaintiff has filed a complaint against a manufacturer and the 
manufacturer has or is required to have answered or otherwise pleaded, 
the court shall order the dismissal of a strict liability in tort claim against 
the certifying defendant, provided the certifying defendant is not within 
the categories set forth in subdivision 3. Due diligence shall be exercised 
by the certifying defendant in providing the plaintiff with the correct 
identity of the manufacturer and due diligence shall be exercised by the 
plaintiff in filing a law suit and obtaining jurisdiction over the 
manufacturer. 
The plaintiff may at any time subsequent to dismissal move to vacate the 
order of dismissal and reinstate the certifying defendant, provided 
plaintiff can show one of the following: 
(a) That the applicable statute of limitation bars the assertion of a 
strict liability in tort cause of action against the manufacturer of the 
product allegedly causing the injury, death or damage 
(b) That the identity of the manufacturer given to the plaintiff by 
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While products liability theory applies to parties in the chain other 
than manufacturers,273 the statute tempers the impact of strict 
liability theory by permitting other sellers to obtain dismissal of 
strict liability claims against them if the product manufacturer is 
available and subject to liability in the suit.274  If the intermediary 
played an active role in the design of a product, or if the 
manufacturer is not available, strict liability principles apply and an 
intermediary in the chain of manufacture and distribution may be 
fully liable.275 
 
the certifying defendant was incorrect. Once the correct identity of 
the manufacturer has been given by the certifying defendant the 
court shall again dismiss the certifying defendant; 
(c) That the manufacturer no longer exists, cannot be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state, or, despite due diligence, the 
manufacturer is not amenable to service of process; 
(d) That the manufacturer is unable to satisfy any judgment as 
determined by the court; or 
(e) That the court determines that the manufacturer would be 
unable to satisfy a reasonable settlement or other agreement with 
plaintiff. 
Subd. 3. Dismissal order prohibited. A court shall not enter a dismissal 
order relative to any certifying defendant even though full compliance 
with subdivision 1 has been made where the plaintiff can show one of the 
following: 
(a) That the defendant has exercised some significant control over 
the design or manufacture of the product, or has provided 
instructions or warnings to the manufacturer relative to the alleged 
defect in the product which caused the injury, death or damage; 
(b) That the defendant had actual knowledge of the defect in the 
product which caused the injury, death or damage; or 
(c) That the defendant created the defect in the product which 
caused the injury, death or damage. 
Subd. 4. Limiting constructing laws. Nothing contained in subdivisions 1 
to 3 shall be construed to create a cause of action in strict liability in tort 
or based on other legal theory, or to affect the right of any person to seek 
and obtain indemnity or contribution. 
 273. Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 89, 179 N.W.2d 64, 68 
(1970). 
 274. In re Shigellosis Litigation, 647 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
 275. Marcon v. Kmart Corp., 573 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), is a good 
example of what happens if the manufacturer is not available.  In that case, a 
twelve-year-old was rendered quadriplegic while sliding down a hill on a sled made 
by Paris Manufacturing and sold to the child’s parents by Kmart.  Id. at 730.  The 
sled was defective because of inadequate warnings and the jury awarded damages 
of slightly less than $8 million.  Id.  Paris was bankrupt.  Id. n.1.  Kmart, which the 
jury found to be zero percent at fault, was nonetheless held liable for the full 
amount because of its position as an intermediary in the chain of manufacture and 
distribution.  Id. at 732. 
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C. 1986 Reforms 
The legislature added the collateral source statute in 1986, 
modifying the common law collateral source rule.  The common 
law collateral source rule provided the plaintiff would not be 
barred from recovering personal injury costs, even if it meant a 
double recovery.276  The rationale was based in part on the policies 
that the defendant should be made to pay for all the damages he 
caused, that the plaintiff should be entitled to reimbursement for 
the benefits for which he paid, and that the wrongdoer should not 
be entitled to receive a windfall by deducting those benefits.277  The 
collateral source statute now permits the reduction of a jury verdict 
by the amount of certain “collateral sources” received by the 
plaintiff up to the time of the verdict.278  The purpose of collateral 
source statutes is to prevent overcompensation and double 
recovery.  The collateral source statute does not, however, prevent 
double recovery in all circumstances.279  The reduction is confined 
to the specified sources and is inapplicable in cases where a 
 
 276. Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 331 (Minn. 1990). 
 277. Smith v. Am. States Ins. Co., 586 N.W.2d 784, 786–87 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1998). 
 278. Imlay, 453 N.W.2d at 331.  Minnesota Statutes section 548.36, subdivision 
1 reads as follows: 
For purposes of this section, "collateral sources" means payments related 
to the injury or disability in question made to the plaintiff, or on the 
plaintiff's behalf up to the date of the verdict, by or pursuant to: 
(1) a federal, state, or local income disability or Workers' 
Compensation Act; or other public program providing medical 
expenses, disability payments, or similar benefits; 
(2) health, accident and sickness, or automobile accident insurance 
or liability insurance that provides health benefits or income 
disability coverage; except life insurance benefits available to the 
plaintiff, whether purchased by the plaintiff or provided by others, 
payments made pursuant to the United States Social Security Act, or 
pension payments; 
(3) a contract or agreement of a group, organization, partnership, 
or corporation to provide, pay for, or reimburse the costs of hospital, 
medical, dental or other health care services; or 
(4) a contractual or voluntary wage continuation plan provided by 
employers or any other system intended to provide wages during a 
period of disability, except benefits received from a private disability 
insurance policy where the premiums were wholly paid for by the 
plaintiff. 
 279. See Imlay, 453 N.W.2d at 331.  In Imlay, the supreme court held that the 
collateral source statute did not violate the equal protection clauses of the 
Minnesota and federal constitutions.  Id. at 332. 
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subrogation right is asserted.280 
A second 1986 reform added a statute precluding the assertion 
of punitive damages when an action is commenced, but permitting 
it after amendment if the district court finds prima facie evidence 
supporting the punitive damages claim.281  The term “prima facie” 
in the statute does not refer to a quantum of evidence, but rather 
to a procedure for screening out unmeritorious punitive damages 
claims.282 
The legislature also took its second run at joint and several 
liability in 1986, retaining the rule of joint and several liability, but 
providing that “[i]f the state or a municipality . . . is jointly liable, 
and its fault is less than thirty-five percent, it is jointly and severally 
liable for an amount no greater than twice the amount of fault.”283  
One of the purposes of the amendment was to protect 
municipalities against higher insurance rates and judgment awards 
and to promote fiscal stability of municipalities.284 
D. 1988 Reforms 
Joint and several liability was the subject of another 
amendment in 1988.  This time, the legislature limited the rule of 
joint and several liability as applied to defendants other than the 
state or a municipality to no more than four times the defendant’s 
fault if that defendant’s fault is fifteen percent or less.285  The need 
 
 280. MINN. STAT. § 548.36, subdivs. 1, 2 (2004). 
 281. Minnesota Statutes section 549.191 (2004) reads as follows: 
Upon commencement of a civil action, the complaint must not seek 
punitive damages. After filing the suit a party may make a motion to 
amend the pleadings to claim punitive damages. The motion must allege 
the applicable legal basis under section 549.20 or other law for awarding 
punitive damages in the action and must be accompanied by one or 
more affidavits showing the factual basis for the claim. At the hearing on 
the motion, if the court finds prima facie evidence in support of the 
motion, the court shall grant the moving party permission to amend the 
pleadings to claim punitive damages. For purposes of tolling the statute 
of limitations, pleadings amended under this section relate back to the 
time the action was commenced. 
 282. Thompson v. Hughart, 664 N.W.2d 372, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 283. Act of Mar. 25, 1986, ch. 455, § 85, 1986 Minn. Laws 882 (amending 
MINN. STAT. § 604.02). 
 284. Imlay, 453 N.W.2d at 330.  The court in Imlay upheld the statute against 
equal protection attacks under the federal and state constitutions.  Id. at 331. 
 285. Act of April 12, 1988, ch. 503, § 3, 1988 Minn. Laws 378 (amending MINN. 
STAT. § 604.02).  As with the rule governing the state and municipalities, this rule 
was superseded by the elimination of joint and several liability in 2003. 
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for the percentage cutoffs was eliminated by the 2003 Comparative 
Fault Act amendment eliminating joint and several liability, subject 
to certain exceptions.286 
In 1988, the legislature also provided for the creation of “a 
commission to study the civil justice system and current and 
alternative methods of compensating injured persons.”287  The 
Commission’s findings and recommendations for legislative action 
were due on January 1, 1990.288  The Minnesota Injury 
Compensation Study Commission held hearings on a variety of 
topics, including “punitive damages; joint and several liability; 
comparative fault; statutes of limitations and repose; alternative 
dispute resolution and incentives to alternative dispute resolution; 
alternative compensation systems and testimony from injured 
persons on damages; the collateral source statute and attorneys’ 
fees; damages, additur and remittitur, caps on damages, and 
periodic payments; and the helmet law, seat belts, homeowners’ 
insurance, and liquor liability.”289 
The Commission recognized both the need for accountability 
and the importance of compensation in the tort system, and the 
importance of the legislature, the courts, and the Commission 
balancing those goals.290  The Commission made recommendations 
in a variety of areas,291 most of which were adopted by the 
 
 286. Act of May 19, 2003, 2003 Minn. Laws 386 (amending MINN. STAT. § 
604.02). 
 287. Act of April 12, 1988, ch. 503, § 4, 1988 Minn. Laws 378. 
 288. Id. 
 289. MINNESOTA INJURY COMPENSATION STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 
LEGISLATURE 1 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT]. 
 290. Id., at 9–10.  The Commission also took the position that tort law should 
consider the following goals: 
1.  Accountability. 
2.  Compensation. 
3.  Predictability. 
4.  Consistency of results. 
5.  Risk prevention. 
6.  Speed of resolution. 
7.  Accessibility to the system. 
8.  Fairness of the system. 
9.  Reasonableness of the costs of the system. 
Id. 
 291. The Committee’s summary of recommendations was as follows: 
A.  Comparative Fault 
1.  The Comparative Fault Act should be amended to provide for the 
application of comparative fault principles in cases involving claims 
for economic loss. 
2.  The definition of "fault" in the statute should be amended in four 
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respects: 
a.  Primary assumption of risk should be explicitly excluded as 
conduct subject to comparison under the act. 
b.  The doctrine of last clear chance should be abolished. 
c. The statute should be amended to provide that evidence of 
unreasonable failure to avoid aggravating an injury or to 
mitigate damages should not be considered in determining the 
cause of an accident, but only in determining the damages a 
claimant is entitled to recover. 
d. The defense of complicity in actions brought under the Civil 
Damage Act, section 340A.801, should no longer be a complete 
defense but should be subject to apportionment under section 
604.01, the Comparative Fault Act. 
B.  Statutes of Repose. 
  Section 541.051, the statute of repose governing claims arising out of 
improvements to real property, should be amended to exclude from the 
statute certain products liability actions. 
C.  Punitive Damages. 
1.  Subdivision 1 of section 549.20 should be amended to provide for 
a "deliberate disregard" standard in place of the current "willful 
indifference" standard, and the deliberate disregard standard should 
be more specifically defined. 
2.  Section 549.20, subdivision 2, should be amended to strengthen 
the standards required to impose liability for punitive damages on a 
principal or employer for the acts of an agent or employee. 
3.  A new subdivision 4 should be added to section 549.20 that will 
require bifurcation of the punitive damages issue upon the request 
of the defendant. 
4.  A new subdivision 5 should be added to section 549.20 that will 
provide specific direction to the courts to review any punitive 
damages award in light of the factors in section 549.20, subdivision 
3. 
D.  Civil Damage Act 
1.  Section 340A.801 should be amended to permit social host 
liability where the social host makes alcoholic beverages available to 
a minor. 
2.  The complete defense of complicity should be a partial defense 
subject to comparison under the Comparative Fault Act. 
E.  Caps on Damages; Enumeration of Damages. 
  Sections 549.23, the statutory cap on certain kinds of damages, and 
section 549.24, requiring enumeration by the finder of fact of certain 
types of damages, should be repealed. 
F.  Collateral Sources. 
  Section 65B.51 and section 548.36 should be amended to require a 
reduction of any jury verdict first by any collateral sources that must be 
deducted under the statutes and second, by the claimant's percentage of 
fault, if any. 
G. Seat Belts and Motorcycle Helmets. 
1.  The penalties for failure to wear seat belts should be increased. 
2.  Motorcycle helmets should once again be mandatory for all 
motorcycle operators and passengers. 
3.  Seat belt evidence should continue to be inadmissible in civil 
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legislature in its 1990 reform package. 
 
litigation. 
4.  The current helmet law provision precluding recovery for 
damages a motorcycle operator or passenger could have avoided by 
wearing a helmet should be preserved. 
H.  Household Exclusion in Homeowners' Policies. 
  The household exclusion should be eliminated through an 
amendment to section 65A.295. 
I.  Penalties for Failure to Carry Automobile Insurance. 
  The penalties for failure to carry automobile insurance as required 
by the No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act and to carry proof of 
insurance coverage should be increased through amendments to section 
65B.67, 169.791  and 169.793. 
J.  Medical Assistance Liens. 
  Section 256B.042 should be amended to bring the State's right to 
reimbursement for medical assistance payments into line with 
reimbursement rights under the No-Fault Act, and the nature of the 
State's reimbursement right should be clarified so that resolution of tort 
claims is facilitated. 
K.  Alternative Dispute Resolution. 
  The Commission approves in substantial part the Final Report of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court and Minnesota State Bar Association Task 
Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution. 
1.  The Commission approves Part I, with the exception of subpart 
D.1.  The Task Force recommendation states that the judge has the 
power to disagree with the alternative dispute resolution process 
adopted by the parties and may order the parties to utilize one of the 
non-binding ADR processes.  The Commission takes the position 
that if the parties agree to the alternative resolution process to be 
used, the judge should not have the power to interfere with that 
choice. 
Second, as to the timing of the conference, subpart D.1 states that if 
the parties are unable to agree on the ADR process or the timing of 
the process, "the court shall schedule a conference with the parties 
within the next 30 days."  The Commission takes the position that 
the court, within 30 days, should schedule a conference to take place 
at some later date. 
2.  The Commission takes no position on Part II of the report, which 
deals with the training and qualification of neutral persons for court 
annexed and court referred ADR programs. 
L.  State and Municipal Tort Liability. 
  The legislature should study the desirability and financial feasibility 
of raising the caps on damages for the state and its political subdivisions. 
M.  Mandatory Automobile Liability Insurance. 
  The legislature should study the mandatory automobile liability 
insurance limits in Minnesota, with a view toward increasing those limits. 
N.  Attorneys Fees 
  Legislative intervention in the form of regulation of contingent fees 
is unwarranted. 
Id., at 4–7. 
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E. 1990 Reforms 
The initial punitive damages statute, which required a showing 
that the defendant acted in “willful indifference to the rights or 
safety of others,” was changed to a “deliberate disregard” 
standard.292  The statute now requires that the determination of 
awards for punitive damages be made in a separate proceeding at 
the request of any of the parties,293 and it mandates the review of 
any punitive damages award in light of the factors the statute 
specifies may be considered in awarding punitive damages.294 
The legislature made five changes in the Comparative Fault 
Act.  The first provided for the application of comparative fault in 
claims for economic loss.295  The remaining changes related to the 
definition of “fault” in the Act.296  The amendments excluded 
primary assumption from the definition of “fault” in the Act;297 
eliminated the doctrine of last clear chance as a defense; provided 
that evidence of an unreasonable failure to avoid aggravating an 
injury or to mitigate damages should not be considered in 
determining the cause of an accident, but only in determining the 
damages to which a claimant is entitled;298 and made the previously 
complete defense of complicity under the Civil Damage Act299 
subject to apportionment under the Comparative Fault Act.300  The 
economic loss claims amendment ensured application of the Act in 
areas such as professional liability, where negligence principles, 
including the defense of contributory negligence, apply.  The 
amendments to the definition of “fault” removed potential 
uncertainties in the Act by eliminating any lingering confusion as 
to whether the defense of last clear chance or primary assumption 
of risk would be subject to apportionment.301  Making complicity a 
partial rather than a complete defense reflects the view of 
 
 292. Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 555, § 15, 1990 Minn. Laws 1563 (amending MINN. 
STAT. § 549.20, subdiv. 1). 
 293. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subdiv. 4 (2004). 
 294. Id. § 549.20, subdiv. 5. 
 295. Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 555, § 19, 1990 Minn. Laws 1564 (amending MINN. 
STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1). 
 296. Id., § 20 (amending MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1(a)). 
 297. Id. 
 298. See id. 
 299. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (2004).  See K.R. v. Sanford, 605 N.W.2d 387, 392–
93 (Minn. 2000) (analyzing the complexity of § 340A.801). 
 300. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1(a) (2004). 
 301. See REPORT, supra note 289, at 14–15. 
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complicity as simply a form of contributory negligence.302  Finally, 
providing that an unreasonable failure to avoid aggravating 
damages or to mitigate be considered only in determining damages 
was an effort to avoid the potential for misapplication of the Act in 
cases where the plaintiff’s negligence (perhaps in failing to act 
reasonably to mitigate damages after an accident) had nothing to 
do with causing the initial injury-causing accident. 
The Civil Damage Act303 was amended in 1990 to permit social 
host liability.  Rather than mandating the form of liability, the 
amendment stated that “[n]othing in this chapter precludes 
common law tort claims against any person 21 years old or older 
who knowingly provides or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a 
person under the age of 21 years.”304 
The legislature repealed the $400,000 cap on general 
damages.305  The Commission recommended the repeal because 
the cap was ineffective and applicable in only a small number of 
cases, and because remittitur by trial courts would be effective to 
eliminate excessive damages awards.306 
The Commission made several recommendations concerning 
the admissibility of seat belt and motorcycle helmet evidence.  It 
recommended that the penalties for failure to wear seat belts 
should be increased, wearing motorcycle helmets should once 
again be mandatory for motorcycle operators and passengers, seat 
belt evidence should continue to be admissible in civil litigation, 
and the then-current law permitting the introduction of evidence 
of failure to wear a motorcycle helmet307 should be preserved.308  
 
 302. See id. at 40–41. 
 303. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (2004). 
 304. Id. § 340A.801, subdiv. 6.  For an analysis of the amendment, see Michael 
K. Steenson, With the Legislature's Permission and the Supreme Court's Consent, Common 
Law Social Host Liability Returns to Minnesota, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 45 (1995).  
The Minnesota Legislature added a somewhat parallel form of social host liability 
under section 340A.90 in 2000. 
 305. MINN. STAT. § 549.23, repealed by Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 555, § 23, 1990 
Minn. Laws 1565. 
 306. REPORT, supra note 289, at 40. 
 307. MINN. STAT. § 169.974, subdiv. 6, repealed by 1999 Minn. Laws, ch. 230, § 
46.  Prior to repeal, subdivision 6 read as follows: 
In an action to recover damages for negligence resulting in any head 
injury to an operator or passenger of a motorcycle, evidence of whether 
or not the injured person was wearing protective headgear that complied 
with standards established by the commissioner of public safety shall be 
admissible only with respect to the question of damages for head injuries.  
Damages for head injuries of any person who was not wearing protective 
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The legislature did not increase the penalties for failure to wear 
seat belts, and it rejected reintroducing the mandatory helmet law. 
Minnesota’s statute of repose for improvements to real 
property309 has been the subject of a significant amount of 
litigation.310  One of the recurring problems has concerned the 
applicability of the statute to property where a separate and 
 
headgear shall be reduced to the extent that those injuries could have 
been avoided by wearing protective headgear that complied with 
standards established by the commissioner of public safety.  For the 
purposes of this subdivision "operator or passenger" means any operator 
or passenger regardless of whether that operator or passenger was 
required by law to wear protective headgear that complied with standards 
established by the commissioner of public safety.   
MINN. STAT. § 169.974, subdiv. 6 (1998). 
 308. REPORT, supra note 289, at 48–51. 
 309. Minnesota Statutes section 541.051 (2004) reads in part as follows: 
 Subdivision 1. Limitation; service or construction of real property; 
improvements. (a) Except where fraud is involved, no action by any 
person in contract, tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any injury to 
property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising 
out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real 
property, nor any action for contribution or indemnity for damages 
sustained on account of the injury, shall be brought against any person 
performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, materials, or 
observation of construction or construction of the improvement to real 
property or against the owner of the real property more than two years 
after discovery of the injury or, in the case of an action for contribution 
or indemnity, accrual of the cause of action, nor, in any event shall such a 
cause of action accrue more than ten years after substantial completion 
of the construction. Date of substantial completion shall be determined 
by the date when construction is sufficiently completed so that the owner 
or the owner's representative can occupy or use the improvement for the 
intended purpose. 
(b) For purposes of paragraph (a), a cause of action accrues upon 
discovery of the injury or, in the case of an action for contribution or 
indemnity, upon payment of a final judgment, arbitration award, or 
settlement arising out of the defective and unsafe condition. 
(c) Nothing in this section shall apply to actions for damages resulting 
from negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of the real 
property improvement against the owner or other person in possession. 
Subd. 2. Action allowed; limitation. Notwithstanding the provisions of 
subdivision 1, in the case of an action which accrues during the ninth or 
tenth year after substantial completion of the construction, an action to 
recover damages may be brought within two years after the date on which 
the action accrued, but in no event may an action be brought more than 
12 years after substantial completion of the construction.   
Id. 
 310. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 
1977); Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. of Red Wing v. General Elec. Corp., 394 N.W.2d 
167 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
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identifiable product is part of the improvement.  To ensure that 
the statute of repose does not apply to certain products liability 
cases, the legislature amended the statute to provide that it is 
inapplicable “to the manufacturer or supplier of any equipment or 
machinery installed upon real property.”311 
The collateral source statute and no-fault act had initially been 
silent about the order of the reduction of damages in a case where 
both the collateral source or no-fault act and the Comparative Fault 
Act applied.  The legislature amended the statutes in 1990 so that 
the comparative fault reduction is made after damages are reduced 
by collateral sources or the offset required by the no-fault act.312 
The Commission recommended that the legislature consider 
raising the caps on state and municipal tort liability.313  The 
legislature subsequently raised the caps in 1997 and in the 2006 
session raised the caps again, effective January 1, 2008.314 
The Commission also took the position that legislative 
intervention in the form of contingent fee regulation was 
unwarranted: “peer pressure and attorney education are the best 
means of ensuring that the contingent fee will not be abused.”315 
The Commission also recommended that the legislature 
should study the mandatory automobile liability insurance limits in 
Minnesota, with a view toward increasing the limits.  The legislature 
did not accept the recommendation.  The automobile liability 
limits316 were last raised in 1985 and have remained at that level. 
F.  Reforms Since 1990 
Since 1990, there have not been equivalent tort reform 
packages.  The legislature significantly reformed joint and several 
liability, one of the standard targets of tort reform.  After chipping 
away at joint and several liability in 1978, 1986, and 1988, the 
legislature finally abolished the rule, subject to limited exceptions, 
 
 311. MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subdiv. 1(d) (2004). 
 312. Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 555, § 6, 1990 Minn. Laws 1560 (amending MINN. 
STAT. § 65B.51, subdiv. 1); Id. § 24, 1990 Minn. Laws 1565 (adding MINN. STAT. § 
548.36, subdiv. 3(c)). 
 313. See MINN. STAT. § 466.04 (2004). 
 314. Act of May 24, 2006, ch. 232, §§ 1, 2, 2006 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 203–04 
(West) (amending MINN. STAT. § 466.04). 
 315. REPORT, supra note 289, at 62. 
 316. MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subdiv. 3 (2004).  The liability limits stand at 
$30,000 bodily injury per person, subject to a $60,000 per accident limitation, with 
$25,000 in property damage coverage.  Id. 
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in 2003.317  In 2005, the legislature amended the appeal bond 
requirement that the amount of the bond “be in the amount of the 
judgment, or a lesser amount approved by the court in the interests 
of justice,” but providing that “[t]he total appeal bond that is 
required of all appellants must not exceed $150,000,000, regardless 
of the value of the judgment.”318 
The point of this somewhat extended analysis of legislative 
reform of the tort system is simply to indicate that the legislature 
has not gone to extremes in limiting the availability of tort 
remedies.  While tort rules that worked to the advantage of injured 
persons have been restricted on occasion, as in the joint and several 
liability legislation, other legislative amendments have worked in 
favor of injured persons, such as the legislative elimination of its 
cap on general damages, the increases on caps on damages for 
claims against the state and municipalities, and the creation of 
social host liability.  Some of the legislation has been effective in 
limiting frivolous litigation, such as the affidavit requirement 
necessary to support medical negligence claims. 
G. Summary 
The conclusion that seems inescapable is that legislative 
reform of the tort system has been balanced in Minnesota.  Reform 
legislation has not radically altered the availability of tort remedies.  
The 1978 reform package was directed primarily at products 
 
 317. Minnesota Statutes section 604.02, subdivision 1, currently reads as 
follows: 
When two or more persons are severally liable, contributions to awards 
shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each, 
except that the following persons are jointly and severally liable for the 
whole award: 
(1) a person whose fault is greater than 50 percent; 
(2) two or more persons who act in a common scheme or plan that 
results in injury; 
(3) a person who commits an intentional tort; or 
(4) a person whose liability arises under chapters 18B – pesticide 
control, 115 – water pollution control, 115A – waste management, 
115B – environmental response and liability, 115C – leaking 
underground storage tanks, and 299J – pipeline safety, public 
nuisance law for damage to the environment or the public health, 
any other environmental or public health law, or any environmental 
or public health ordinance or program of a municipality as defined 
in section 466.01. 
MINN. STAT. § 604.02, subdiv. 1 (2004). 
 318. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 550.36 (West Supp. 2006). 
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liability law, but its impact was insignificant.  If anything, the 
comparative fault amendments in that year facilitated recovery.  
The 1990 reform package is the best indication of balanced reform.  
The Legislative Study Commission recommended moderation, and 
the legislature packaged a series of reforms that clarified or filled 
gaps in existing legislation and eliminated inequities in the tort 
system, but without making radical changes.  Subsequent 
legislation is problem-specific, for the most part.  From the 
standpoint of “tort reform,” probably the most significant changes 
have been the medical negligence affidavit requirement and the 
2003 abandonment of joint and several liability, with only limited 
exceptions.  Minnesota may not score high on “tort reform” 
assessments, but, on the other hand, it may well be that there is less 
to react to in terms of the common law of torts as structured by the 
supreme court. 
IV.  IS THE TORT SYSTEM PROGRESSIVE? 
Instead of asking whether a specific tort system is progressive, 
the question might be asked whether it is liberal or conservative; 
but those terms also may present problems of definition.  A liberal 
decision, whether judicial or legislative, might be defined as one 
that favors the right of a plaintiff by adopting a rule that enhances 
the plaintiff’s opportunity to recover for injury, either by removing 
a barrier to that recovery, by adopting a new cause of action, or by 
extending the right to recover in the context of a settled claim.  A 
conservative decision might be labeled as one that generally favors 
a more restricted tort system.319  So a decision that retards or limits 
the ability of an injured person to recover might be deemed a 
conservative decision.  Maintaining the status quo may be a liberal 
or conservative response, depending on how current rules are 
viewed. 
There are problems in defining progressivism or what 
progressive legal thought is, and also problems in discerning 
whether concepts of progressivism can readily be applied to a tort 
system.320  Professor Hovenkamp has noted the importance of a 
legislative emphasis on wealth redistribution as a characteristic of 
progressives: 
 
 319. See Anita Bernstein, Muss Es Sein?  Not Necessarily, Says Tort Law, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 9 (2004). 
 320.  See id. at 8. 
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The greatest achievement of Progressive legal policy is the 
modern welfare state.  Progressive legal thought was characterized 
by a belief that government regulation often allocates resources 
better than private markets.  Because the common law is poorly 
equipped to redistribute wealth or manage the economy, most 
Progressives were strongly committed to legislation, rather than 
changes in judge-made law, to facilitate their goals.  The 
Progressives also had a vision of government that was essentially 
"republican" rather than libertarian, or contractarian.  By 
republican, I mean that Progressives believed that government 
officials should use economics, the social sciences, ethics, or other 
objective criteria to help define the best policy.  They did not 
believe that policymaking was an exercise in measuring the 
preferences of individual citizens by tabulating their votes.  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, Progressive legal thought was 
dedicated to the propositions that total social welfare would be 
increased if wealth was distributed more evenly across society and 
that the state should take an active role in such redistribution.321 
Progressivism in one sense might seem at odds with tort law 
insofar as it would encourage the replacement of tort law with a 
system of social insurance. It might be argued that the early 
progressive agenda advanced by torts scholars, including, for 
example, the elimination of immunities, expansion of products 
liability law, and abolition of the special duty rules in cases 
involving landowner liability, would be inconsistent with that 
goal.322  But it might also be argued that a set of tort rules that 
maximizes the potential for compensation is consistent with a 
second-best reliance on common law rules where significant 
legislative reform is not practically or politically feasible.  In that 
sense, it might be used to define a system of plaintiff-oriented rules 
that maximize the potential for compensation.323  It might be 
 
 321.  Herbert Hovenkamp, The Mind and Heart of Progressive Legal Thought, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 149, 149 (1995).  Professor Hovenkamp argues that the end of 
Progressive legal thought can be dated to the 1960s, with the infusion of a 
renewed interest in an unregulated market which, coupled with critiques of the 
democratic process, represented “a sharp turn from the essentially republican 
vision of government that dominated progressive legal thought to a more classical 
view emphasizing both the efficiency and robustness of private markets and the 
many imperfections of public processes.”  Id. at 150. 
 322.  Anthony J. Sebok, The Fall and Rise of Blame in American Tort Law, 68 
BROOK. L. REV. 1031, 1043–44 (2003). 
 323.  See Michael Rustad, The Jurisprudence of Hope: Preserving Humanism in Tort 
Law, 28 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1099 (1994). 
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argued that law is progressive, then, insofar as it contains incentives 
toward the redistribution of wealth and empowers hurt individuals 
who seek redress for their injuries, even if it is through a common 
law mechanism.324  Taking a long view of tort law by focusing on the 
decisions of the last half century might justify an argument that tort 
law has been progressive in Minnesota.  Conversely, narrowing the 
focus by breaking down the decisions of the Minnesota Supreme 
Court and viewing the court’s reasoning as it responds on a case-by-
case to the challenges of determining what the principles 
governing compensation should be,  one sees decisions based on a 
patchwork of policies that are not consistently progressive in 
outlook. 
While systems may have both progressive and anti-progressive 
effects,325 if the focus is on the broader tort system—a melded 
common law and legislative approach to liability for injury—it is 
much more difficult to characterize that system as progressive.  The 
Minnesota State Legislature’s approach to the tort system may, 
depending on where the emphasis is placed, have progressive 
elements, but it too would be difficult to characterize as 
progressive.  The legislature’s most detailed reform foray, the 1990 
reform package, is a balanced response to a variety of issues that 
were considered by that year’s legislative study commission. 
Dr. Weinstein, in his introductory article in this Symposium,326 
 
 324.  See Bernstein, supra note 319, at 25.  Courts will ultimately determine 
whether legislative reforms unduly impair the right to recovery in a tort system.  
John C.P. Goldberg, in The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right 
to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 626 (2005), emphasizes that 
“[t]he law of redress is basic to our conception of liberal-constitutional 
government, and was built into the fabric of our legal system.”  Id.  In considering 
criticisms of judicial decisions striking down tort reform statutes, he argues that 
critics are wrong in supposing that there is legislative primacy in the area, and that 
courts “are entitled to ask, and should ask, whether a given reform unduly burdens 
the ability of individuals to vindicate their rights and interests by obtaining redress 
from others who have wrongfully injured them.”  Id. at 727–27.  If the reform does 
that, courts should hold the reform unconstitutional in violation of due process.  
Id. 
 325.  Id. at 24. 
 326.  See Jack Russell Weinstein, On the Meaning of the Term Progressive: A 
Philosophical Investigation, 33 WM. MITCHELL. L. REV. 1 (2006).  Richard Hofstadter 
defined “Progressivism” as follows: 
[T]hat broader impulse toward criticism and change that was everywhere 
so conspicuous after 1900, when the already forceful stream of agrarian 
discontent was enlarged and redirected by the growing enthusiasm of 
middle-class people for social and economic reform.  As all observant 
contemporaries realized, Progressivism in this larger sense was not 
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engages in a lengthy philosophical inquiry into the meaning of 
progressivism; he expresses reluctance to define it, although he 
does offer a tentative definition of a progressive as “a person who 
believes that social reform is achievable over time with the proper 
mixture of individual participation and government support.”327 
The progressive looks forward and recognizes that there is a 
universal standard for justice while acknowledging that only by 
understanding particular contexts and circumstances can the 
adequacy of the progress be measured.  There is a strong 
egalitarian underpinning to progressivism.  Group identification is 
essential to any understanding of how the benefits of progress 
should be distributed, but that should not eclipse the unique 
situation of each person who seeks those benefits.  He concludes by 
emphasizing that “the progressive seeks moderation: moderation in 
change, moderation in assistance, and moderation in autonomy.”328  
Minnesota’s tort system may fit that concept in part, but it seems 
clear that if it does, it is a moderate system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
One of the issues concerning labels is whether they make any 
difference in assessing the value of a particular system.  If 
Minnesota’s tort system is deemed to be progressive, so what?  Does 
it provide a basis for an assessment of where the supreme court will 
go when faced with cutting-edge issues?  Will it give the legislature 
pause in dealing with tort reform issues? 
 
confined to the Progressive Party but affected in a striking way all the 
major and minor parties and the whole tone of American political life.  It 
was, to be sure, a rather vague and not altogether cohesive or consistent 
movement, but this was probably the secret of its considerable successes, 
as well as of its failures.  While Progressivism would have been impossible 
without the impetus given by certain social grievances, it was not nearly 
so much the movement of any social class, or coalition of classes, against 
a particular class or group as it was a rather widespread and remarkably 
good-natured effort of the greater part of society to achieve some not 
very clearly specified self-reformation.  Its general theme was the effort to 
restore a type of economic individualism and political democracy that 
was widely believed to have existed earlier in America and to have been 
destroyed by the great corporation and the corrupt political machine; 
and with that restoration to bring back a kind of morality and civil purity 
that was also believed to have been lost. 
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 5 (Knopf 1972) 
(1955). 
 327.  Weinstein, supra note 326, at 50. 
 328.  Id. 
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The label may not provide a basis for predicting where the 
court will go in an individual case, of course.  Its decisions provide 
a clear indication of that.  Case-by-case development of the 
common law may narrow the focus to the particular set of policy 
considerations that are relevant in an individual case, as gleaned 
from the court’s prior precedents, rather than expanding the 
question to one of the fundamental purposes of the tort system.  
It may help put the tort system in context, however, in the face 
of continuing calls for the reform of the system.  The powerful 
drumbeat of tort reform prompts judgments about the tort system, 
applying a litmus test that results in the classification of states 
according to the degree of reform they have achieved, irrespective 
of the labels.  The judgment of imbalance is typically made based 
on a reform headcount of key legislative initiatives, without a 
detailed overview of the tort system.  The detail is warranted and 
necessary, however, if there is to be a valid judgment about whether 
there are tort system excesses, particularly in the stated law. 
  
 
  
 
